UK and the World Bank 2004: box ticked

The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) quietly published its first annual report of the UK's involvement with the World Bank in March 2005. The report's lack of depth suggests that DFID saw this as a box-ticking exercise rather than a serious commitment to improved accountability.

What little substance is contained in the dozen or so pages of large-font type comes under the heading of 'institutional effectiveness'. DFID calls for:

• Greater predictability of financing and the matching of funds to national budget cycles;
• An increase in the proportion of support delivered through programmatic loans;
• Greater management accountability for "performance and delivery against results and implementation"; and
• More progress on disclosure, including the publication of board documents, Executive Directors' statements to the board and analytical work.

Under the heading of 'global challenges' appear anodyne paragraphs on the now-perfunctory topics of aid, debt and trade as well as on extractive industries, education and 'voice'. No mention of key Bank policy developments during the period examined such as the 'high-risk high-reward' infrastructure plan or revisions in a number of key safeguard policies. Also absent is discussion of the UK position on investment projects, save a few soothing words on why the UK backed the enormously controversial Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

DFID applauds the Bank's increased use of poverty and social impact assessment (PSIA), citing the Malawian case where a PSIA pointed out the risks of full-scale privatisation of the state-run agricultural marketing board. Overlooked is the fact that the Bank delayed publication of the study for two years, withholding it until just after the Malawian parliament had agreed to the reforms.

It is unclear from this report who DFID feels that it is accountable to in its dealings with the World Bank. There is only the vaguest of references to whether or not it achieved its own institutional objectives for the Bank, and no mention of whether UK objectives for spring and annual meetings were met. There is no summary of DFID's progress in improving transparency and accountability to UK citizens in its dealings with the Bank, nor is there anything on follow-up taken to questions raised by the International Development Committee. Absent are any references to the findings of the Bank's watchdog groups, the Operations Evaluation Department (which conducted critical reviews of PRSPs, the Comprehensive Development Framework, lending for the energy sector and knowledge management during this period) and the Inspection Panel. On the international front, the report is silent on the US senate hearings on corruption in the IFIs and the initiation by the G8 of a review of the role of the BWIs.

One would have expected that the report would have included appendices detailing UK financial support to the Bank, UK objective notes for the spring and annual meetings, and the new DFID institutional strategy paper, objectives and indicators for the Bank. Presumably the reader is expected to fish around on DFID and HMT websites for these. All in all, a lacklustre effort.

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Published: 19 August 2005 , last edited: 21 August 2007

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