The regulation of excessive speculation in commodity markets: what’s at stake
Civil society event at the World Bank spring meetings, 13 April 2011
14 April 2011 | Minutes
Professor Greenburg of Johns Hopkins University
Price volatility is not a demand situation but an issue with casino culture in banks
Speculative fever does not represent real demand and leads to price distortion
Supply and demand equilibrium remain the same despite price volatility
Limits imposed on speculative practices internationally are not enough
Speculation leads to significant price volatility leading to inability to effectively hedge prices
In 1991 Goldman Sachs invited wealthy people to bet against the market: they hedge their position by shorting markets; the paper market on oil was 13 times actual oil market
French, Japanese and Germans are committed to regulating speculation
Middle East crises has nothing to do with oil price volatility
Purely based on speculative attack
Sean Cota, advisor to US Congress on regulatory reform
"You measure bubbles after they collapse, until then it’s supply and demand"
Botswana to host unregulated markets
Leverage is good if used correctly otherwise can be destructive; it is a key component of speculation. Market players can get infinite leverage.
There is a major glut of oil yet prices remain high, demonstrating market distortion of speculation
Over-financialisation and unregulated markets tend to create disequilibrium and major market distortion
Regulatory infrastructure needs to be developed
David Frank, financial analyst
Need to follow evidence
Level of commodity speculation is unprecedented
Speculators often engage in spreading investments to make up losses
Argument that speculation increases liquidity is specious at best
Amount of hedgers have actually declined while speculators have increased
Best solution is to allow 30% speculation maximum and to eliminate index funds