We would like to thank all the readers who took time to fill out our online survey and give us feedback on the Bretton Woods Project’s communications, including the Bretton Woods Update. Congratulations go to the winners of our prize draw. Copies of The political economy of development: the World Bank, neoliberalism and development research, edited by Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine and Elisa Van Waeyenberge, were won by Christian Kellerman and Michael Reynolds. Copies of Controlling institutions: international organisations and the global economy by Randall Stone were sent to Gao Haihong, Faith Nilsson, Suresh Nanwani and Simone Datzberger. Finally, Financial crisis and the global imbalances: a development perspective , by Yilmaz Akyüz, was won by Leo Phillips, Meala Tesfamichael, Sandra Martinsone and Arthur Muliro. We hope to update you in more detail on the results of the survey in the next issue.
The Political Economy of Development provides tools for gaining an understanding of the World Bank’s role and the evolution of its thinking and activities, applying them across a range of topics. The research, practice and scholarship of development are always set against the backdrop of the World Bank, whose formidable presence shapes both development practice and thinking. This book brings together academics that specialise in different subject areas of development and reviews their findings in the context of the World Bank as knowledge bank, policy-maker and financial institution. The volume offers a compelling contribution to our understanding of development studies and of development itself.
How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina.
This collection of papers examines – from a standpoint of promoting stability and growth in developing countries – key policy lessons to be drawn from the devastating global economic crisis of 2008-09. Leading economist Yilmaz Akyuz underlines the need for economic restructuring along the above lines with a view to more effective crisis prevention and intervention. Given their vulnerability to shocks and limited capacity to respond, he says, this reform process is an endeavour in which developing economies have a crucial interest.