The Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four (G24) released its communiqué for the 2025 IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings on 22 April – against the backdrop of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, which predicted a slowdown in growth for emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) to 3.7 per cent in 2025 and 3.9 per cent in 2026. The G24 voiced concern over the “tightening of global aid budgets amid escalating needs,” warning that tariff hikes could disproportionately affect EMDEs and Low-Income Countries (LICs), “given their limited diversification and greater dependence on imported inputs,” adding that many EMDEs have already faced rising bond yields, capital flow reversals and depreciating currencies.

For a Springs that felt particularly deflating – with the Bank and Fund bending to accommodate the new US administration’s regressive agenda (see Dispatch Springs 2025) – the communiqué largely reflected the geopolitical tensions of the moment, falling short of offering a coherent response to the deepening structural inequalities that define the global financial architecture. Explaining the lack of broader consensus, Pablo Quirno, Chair of the G24 and Argentina’s Secretary of Finance – representing a government closely aligned with the US and the Fund’s austerity agenda, as reflected in its recent $20 billion agreement focused on drastic spending cuts and deregulation – noted at the press briefing, “the G24 is a very diverse group of countries.”

The group doubled down on domestic policymaking as the “first line of defense,” framing domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) as central to achieving sustainable development. The elephant in the room – the continued failure to confront the structural constraints embedded in the global financial architecture which have systematically eroded fiscal space in developing countries – means that DRM risks becoming little more than a renewed push for austerity. Quirno highlighted this framing at the press briefing, calling for G24 members to “bring resilience into our own economies” through “a credible fiscal path” and “sound monetary policies” to support fiscal consolidation, remarking that “at the end of the day that is what investors are looking at.”

A slight positive is the G24’s continued endorsement of tax reforms and progressive taxation, highlighting the importance of multilateral collaboration to tackle cross-border challenges like illicit financial flows and tax base erosion. The group stressed that “constructive engagement” is essential to advancing the G20-OECD Inclusive Framework and the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (see Dispatch Annuals 2024).

Fragmented calls for IMF reforms

Noting that “high debt burdens and rising debt service costs continue to undermine countries’ capacity to finance development,” the group welcomed the planned review of the World Bank-IMF LICs Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) and called for reforms to promote sustainable debt management, enhance debt transparency, and improve country-risk assessments by credit rating agencies. The group also advocated for improvements to the G20 Common Framework, ensuring the full participation of all creditor classes. Civil society has long argued that technical reforms alone are insufficient and have been calling for the IMF to integrate social, human rights and climate considerations into its debt sustainability analyses (see Inside the Institutions, What is the World Bank & IMF DSF for LICs?).

Referencing the need to “strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries in the governance structure of the Fund,” the group called for “rapid progress” towards quota realignment under the 17th General Review of Quotas. Yet, without concrete recommendations, this call may fall short of addressing civil society demands for reform after two decades of stalled progress (see Briefing, A Way Out for IMF Reform).

Elsewhere, the group supported the Fund’s capacity development, financing, programme design, conditionalities and macro-critical work, and expressed hope the Comprehensive Surveillance Review would strengthen active monitoring of countries’ policies. It also lamented the “limited progress in operationalising the rechannelling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) through Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs),” urging for “innovative solutions” to better leverage SDRs for global challenges. Yet, this marks a retreat from previous communiqués, which had advocated for a new SDR allocation to reduce borrowing costs and address debt vulnerabilities (see Dispatch Annuals 2023; see Briefing, Reconceptualising Special Drawing Rights as a tool for development finance).

World Bank: evolution without transformation  

The G24 welcomed progress on the World Bank’s Evolution Roadmap, reaffirming the Bank’s mission of poverty eradication and supporting efforts to reduce the cost of capital through tools like hybrid capital instruments and portfolio guarantees. The group also expressed support for recent reforms to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan pricing but cautioned that borrowing costs remain high, urging “prompt action on stage 2 pricing adjustments.”

The group further noted the importance of moving forward on the Bank’s 2025 Shareholding Review, calling for action “in line with the Lima Principles, to address current misalignment, strengthen voice and representation, enhance IBRD legitimacy, and ensure equitable voting power.”

While making no mention of gender, the group stressed that “the pace of climate action needs to accelerate”, calling for “sustained support through adequate financial resources, technology transfer, technical assistance, and capacity building” to enable just transition pathways. Worryingly, however, it also welcomed the Bank’s expanded focus on all energy sources – including nuclear and gas, and potentially other fossil fuels – risking the lock-in of developing countries into high-carbon development pathways.

While the G24 called for increased grant and concessional financing “tailored towards the adaptation needs of developing countries” and urged developed countries to fulfil existing climate finance pledges, its emphasis on “blended finance mechanisms and risk-sharing tools” to attract private investment overlooks the rising public cost of de-risking private sector on developing countries (see Report, Gambling with the planet’s future?) – particularly for adaptation, where profitability is limited. Without safeguards, climate finance risks continuing to flow predominantly as debt, tied to policy conditions promoting privatisation and liberalisation, deepening dependency and constraining countries’ green transition efforts (see Inside the Institutions, The World Bank and climate finance).

Finally, the group called for “faster progress” in implementing other outstanding recommendations from the G20 Independent Experts Group on MDB reforms, including mitigating currency risks through local currency lending, and noted – without any further details – they “look forward to the forthcoming United Nations Financing for Development Conference” (see Observer Springs 2025).