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G20 chair’s summary analysis Annual Meetings 2025

South African officials brief the press on the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings at the 2025 Annual Meetings in Washington, DC. Photo: IMF Photo/Erin Scott
South African officials brief the press on the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings at the 2025 Annual Meetings in Washington, DC. Photo: IMF Photo/Erin Scott

Article summary

The Group of Twenty (G20) is an informal forum in which the world’s major economies discuss global financial and development issues. The African Union is also a member since 2023. South Africa holds the Presidency of the G20, which is annually rotated amongst its members. The United States will assume the presidency on 1 December 2025. At the 2025 Annual Meetings, the G20 once again failed to agree on a Communique issuing instead a chair’s summary. The summary ignored the Sevilla Commitment and climate, and reflected continued challenges to global cooperation on issues pivotal to economic and geopolitical stability.

The meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors took place on 15 and 16 October 2025 on the sidelines of the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, DC. As the Group was once again unable to agree on the text of a Communiqué, the South African presidency issued a chair’s summary. 

Echoing a central theme of the Annual Meetings, the Summary noted that the global economy has shown surprising resilience during 2025, making veiled reference to US trade tariffs and their implications by noting “elevated uncertainty and complex challenges…ongoing wars and conflicts, geopolitical and trade tensions, disruptions to global supply chains, high debt levels, and frequent extreme weather events and natural disasters,” and stressing that “all excessive imbalances should be further analysed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).” The use of “extreme weather and natural disasters” language and lack of reference to the climate emergency, presumably due to US pressure, is clear evidence of the challenges facing the Group’s coherence. In that regard, the Summary’s reference to the importance of central bank independence, in light of the US administration’s attacks on the independence of the US Federal Reserve, is noteworthy. 

While the outcome of the 4th Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and its outcome document, the Sevilla Commitment, were touted by some as an important victory for a multilateralism under threat, the fact that it was only referenced once in the chair’s summary reinforces a common theme at the IMF and World Bank Meetings, that ministers of finance and central bank governors – and not only of G20 states – see their ministry of foreign affairs colleagues and the UN as largely an afterthought. The exclusion of references to FfD4 is made more telling because it seems to yet again disregard the fact that FfD4 was a head of state-convened process facilitated by the UN system. The same “UN process” argument was made by the Global North to head off calls for a review of World Bank and IMF governance reform at FfD4.

International financial architecture

The Summary focused significant attention on the need to increase multilateral development bank (MDB) lending volume and “most members” welcomed the Capital Adequacy Framework report. The document also made references to several process documents related to the G20 MDB Roadmap, indicating that this remains an area of relative consensus and in which plans are advancing. On MDB governance issues, the Summary highlighted that, “members looked forward to the outcome of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 2025 Shareholding Review in line with the Lima shareholding principles…[and] underscored the need for enhancing the representation and voice of developing countries in decision-making in MDBs and other international economic and financial institutions.”

The IMF quota issue was raised as customary in the document, with the usual reiteration of “commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the centre of the Global Financial Safety Net.” The document also makes hopeful, if not naïve, references to progress on the 16th General Review of Quotas, which the US congress has yet to approve, while explicitly recognising the current impasses to reform,  and calling for the IMF Executive Board to develop a set of principles guiding future discussions on IMF quotas and governance by the 2026 Spring Meetings in line with the Diriyah Declaration.

What climate emergency?

The paragraphs on sustainable finance made clear the divergences of views within the membership on the topic, and language about the urgency and impact of the climate emergency was conspicuous by its absence. The Summary makes a passing reference to the 30th UN Climate Conference taking place in Belém, Brazil in November, limiting it to the fact that members “acknowledged the upcoming COP30 in Belém and noted participating countries’ engagement within the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers.”

Reflecting long-standing African priorities, the document focused on the need to improve infrastructure in the continent and called for increased private finance and de-risking to that end. Recognising the risks posed to financial stability by crypto currencies, stable coins and non-bank financial intermediation, the Summary devoted five paragraphs on the need for action and coordination on financial sector issues and financial inclusion.

Global tax cooperation remains contentious, despite progress

The topic of tax received significant attention, with six paragraphs dedicated to it. The Summary opened with a note that “concerns” about the OECD’s Pillar Two approach – which introduces a 15 per cent global minimum tax rate and is intended to prevent multinational corporations from shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions – are being addressed “constructively” and, “with the shared goal of finding a balanced and practical solution that is acceptable to all as soon as possible.”

The statement recognises the slow pace of progress, and divergent positioning on the UN Tax Convention is also evident, as the Summary highlights that, “Members note the ongoing negotiations to establish a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, and the participating G20 members reaffirmed the objectives to reach a broad consensus and build on existing achievements, processes, and the ongoing work of other international organisations, while seeking to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.” Unsurprisingly, the document reflects a greater deal of consensus on the crucial role played by domestic resource mobilisation.

The debt crisis received little dedicated attention in the Summary, with passing references made to high debt levels in the opening economic outlook section. That said, the G20 issued a Ministerial Declaration on Debt Sustainability on Friday 17 October. The declaration, which was deemed to “fall short” by civil society organisations, came after a 14 October open letter to South African President Ramaphosa signed by 165 civil society and debt justice organisations calling for a series of actions to tackle the debt crisis, including the establishment of UN-led sovereign debt reform anchored in human rights and equity and the creation of a borrowers’ club. 

The Summary closes with mention of South Africa’s initiative to review the G20 Finance Track operating and decision-making processes.” Given the importance and implications of the Finance Track work, eventual actions on its recommendations could have consequences for the broader G20 activities. 

US Secretary of State, Scott Bessent, outlined the priorities for the US presidency of the G20 next year at the sidelines of the G20 meeting, noting it will focus on economic growth, deregulation and energy, CNBC Africa reported on 17 October.