Enhancing policy and practice for development impact: Labour rights and accountability on IFC projects
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Article summary
Notes from the Civil Society Policy Forum on 15 October titled Enhancing policy and practice for development impact: Labour rights and accountability on IFC projects. The Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) recently released reports surveying labor issues on IFC projects and analyzing the IFC’s use of leverage to remedy performance standards noncompliance. This session looks at the IFC’s upcoming Sustainability Framework review and the opportunity it provides to improve compliance on IFC projects and strengthen development impact.
Moderator
- Ilana Berger, Bank Information Center
Panelists
- Irum Ahsan, Manager, Advisory Function, CAO
- Alex Campbell, Washington Office Director, ITUC
- Larissa Luy, Director, Environmental and Social Risk, WBG
A recoding of this session is available here.
Ilana: This session will look at Labor Rights and Accountability on IFC Projects.
The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) published a report early this year, on labour and working conditions in IFC projects. It draws on 59 labour complaints the CAO received between 2013 and 2020. It found that labour complaints made up 39 per cent of all the eligible complaints the CAO received, and nearly 2/3 of those complaints came directly from workers and more than. In half those cases, workers described fear, threats, or retaliation for speaking up. This is a common theme in development finance projects, unfortunately.
This conversation is very timely as the IFC embarks in the Review of its Sustainability Framework, which hasn’t been update since 2012.
While the review provides the opportunity to close gaps in the standard itself, much of what CAO found has to do with the existing standard, with how the existing standards are applied. This is less an issue of poor standards and more an issue of = poor implementation of existing standards. There is poor supervision and monitoring.
Monitoring and supervision only work when communities and workers feel able to share their concerns with those that are carrying out the supervision.
Another point we’ll be talking about today is the IFC’s use of its leverage over clients.
This session today also connects to the World Bank’s recent focus on jobs. The Bank talks about the need to create jobs but not on the quality of them. Better jobs require protections for workers.
In BIC’s experience, the projects the IFC invest on come with problematic experience for workers.
Questions we will be covering in today’s session: What are labour violations and how can the IFC and World Bank do to address them, either through standards revision or through better implementation of existing standards? And how does the IFC use its leverage or not over its clients to enforce those standards?
Irum: will talk about insights and labour conditions report, which was aimed at recognising the blind spots the institution may have.
The report has three points focus: prevalence in complaints, severity of potential worker harm, strategic relevance to how IFC applies Performance Standard 2 (PS2).
The first issue that we focused on was wages, contracts, terms of employment. And we saw that 83 per cent of our labour caseload presented this issue. This was also important because wages basically define whether you’re trapped into poverty or elevated out of that poverty trap.
The second focus area was grievance redress mechanisms. If these are good, functioning well, and providing redress, then of course the issue should get resolved there without it leading necessarily to harm and getting escalated to the institution or the independent mechanism. We saw that 27 per cent of our complaints basically had issues with the grievance redress mechanisms.
The third focus area was freedom of association. Of 59 complaints we looked into in the last decade of CAO’s work, 15 per cent of our complaints represented this issue. Almost 50 per cent of our labour complaints had the issue of threats and reprisals.
Labour complaints made a good share of CAOs workload. 39 per cent of IFC complaints were labour complaints, mostly centred in Africa and Latin America, nearly half related to non-standard contracts (temporary, for example), related to unpaid wages, complaint, retaliatory, termination as current pattern.
The last trend that we saw in our cases was that there were unpaid wages, which was leading to a complaint, which was then leading to retaliatory termination.
We benchmarked IFC’s PS2 with other multilateral institutions, like the ILO, and other bilateral as well as six MDBs.
PS2 generally talks about principle and it’s a good standard that IFC has, but it lacks in specifications that make the standard work.
There were also challenges around implementation. IFC does not lack in tools, it has pretty good tools but their use is inconsistent. It’s the inconsistent use of those tools that created problems in our data analysis. For instance, found labour risk identification has not been applied consistently, supervision was weak, safety concerns, etc.
Another implementation challenge was the contextual risk assessment as well. Labour is one issue in which the country context, the national context, the legal context matter. The retaliatory environment context needs to be assessed.
Emerging issues: wages have increased but not at the pace cost of food, housing, etc. on standards forms of employment are growing. PS2 does not articulate how it applies to non-standards forms of work. Supply chains growing but PS2 stops at the primary supplier tier.
Also the effects of climate change. Workers in hot indoor or outdoor environments, performing physically demanding work in especially agriculture and manufacturing sectors need special attention. Renewable energy and critical mineral supply chains may expose workers to hazardous working conditions, so that needs attention as well as an emerging issue. These risks basically highlight the need to integrate heat stress and other climate-related occupational health and safety hazards more explicitly in PS2.
Recommendations:
- Update PS 2: address gaps and strengthen alignment with standards from peers MDBs, ILO…; reflect emerging issues in IFC update of PS2
- strengthen the risk identification at due diligence stage and integrate labour risks into early screening
- Changes need to be assessed at the due diligence stage so that one understands what other kinds of labour may be employed in this particular project.
- Enhance labour risk mitigation and supervision: increase level of detail, adaptability, strengthen management of retaliation and intimidation. Supervise sites visits more strategically, and adapt to workforce evolving needs, clarify internal escalation for labour risks
- Bolster IFC expertise and client capacity: leverage local labour expertise, strength staff capacity, more capacity building support.
Alex: we really appreciate and note the IFC’s historical leadership among peer institutions in the development and implementation of performance standards that are specific to labour rights.
The IFC was the first MDB to include labour standards in its performance standards and that came out from labour struggles from a bitter strike in Haiti, in which management laid off 350 workers.
Trade unions have worked closely with IFC management through complaint cases and to try to improve workers’ condition. However, all site trade unions visit find violations, retaliations wages issues and illegal non-regulatory work.
This is not unique to the IFC, workplace is a fundamental site of conflict. The IFC does have a responsibility to make sure that its investments uphold fundamental labour rights, and through the performance standards, it’s committed to doing it.
I would like to talk about the IFC’s standards and their implementation, how can we use decades of work, CAO findings, and collaboration with people and use them to improve implementation.
Three cases brought to the CAO to illustrate issues: we found it very difficult to hold clients accountable for their violations, real unwillingness from clients to engage trade unions and workers in many cases and involve workers in trade unions and assess risks and violations, which we also say from the IFC side too.
The first is the Bujigali Dam case from Uganda: approved in 2007, Uganda Building Workers Union (UBWU) tried to organise workers on the project, and get an agreement before with the employer for safety, workers improved conditions, etc. In that time 3 workers lost their life. One IFC staff managed to bring people to the table fortunately, an IFC officer intervened and scheduled a meeting in Kampala with the UBWU and the client. And in December of 2007, notably a month prior to the actual disbursement of the investment, the union and the contractor reached an agreement with marked improvements in wages, working hours, and safety. Unfortunately, after the disbursement was made, engagement and leverage dropped off, and other workers working on the same site who weren’t able to get an agreement, weren’t able to kind of come to the table with the employer, did not get the same assistance. And more than 15 years after the disbursement the CAO closed major cases about health and safety and compensation just last year. Some of the things run substantial part of more than decades.
Another case was the IFC $50 billion loan to Avianca in 2006, Colombia, to expand the fleet despite persistent concerns, an ILO complaint that had been filed against Avianca, Colombia being one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a trade unionist. Trade unions filed a complaint with the CAO raising concerns not only about kind of endemic retaliation at the company, the company retaliating its employees by firing union members and offering preferential routes and benefits to non-union members, CAO found assessment was faulty, and that the investment should have never been approved, but this came out very late after Avianca had actually paid its loan.
Last case is the Sheraton Grand Concrete, in 2016 with a $26 million loan for a hotel in Conakry, Guinea. Management illegally under Guinean law, delayed the election of trade union delegates from 2016 until 2020. After the election, only ramped up their anti-union attacks, retaliating against leaders and vandalizing union offices. IFC commissioned a report from an independent auditor that was finalized year later in 2021 and not disclosed and developed a corrective action plan. A later CAO report found there was little evidence it was implemented. In 2024 the report closed, given project was over, with the client only offering to repay its loan, with no attempt to remedy its violations.
These are endemic issues, which coincides with what we have found thought time. We hope sustainability framework review provide policies that put the level of specificity we need to make these standards work.
Freedom of association, which also came out in the CAO report, is core to workers’ rights, access of union workers to sites are essential for projects to work
Larissa: I started at the IFC in 2005 and was the first labour expert hired from the private sector.
We welcome the findings of CAO, which we have also identified. I.e: wages, contracts, over time etc, we face them day to day in the implementation of PS2 in projects that we operate.
These are systemic issues in countries where we operate, not only in the private sector, but also in public sector (due for example to lack of legislation, lack of inspections in the country, etc)
The theme of these Annuals has been about jobs, but it is not only about the number but also about quality and safety of these jobs – WBG is very focused on this. Jobs created need to bring dignity to people.
We agree with many of the findings of the CAO report.
For instance, risk assessment: we have moved away from the cases on the issues Alex has brought. We were in the early years of PS2, and learned through that engagement, and made us moved forward.
In the case Bujagali it is correct in terms of the labour risk assessment was not adequate. In Avianca, we fully agree, we did not look at the contextual risk of the country and also complaints that had been brought to Avianca previously.
The engagement we have with CAO and unions have also moved forward.
There’re things we need to assess and be aware of, and we should do better: there are regions where overtime is an issue, for instance in Thailand national law allows for this. Due to national legislations, sometimes we cannot enforce these standards, as they are allowed by national law. The public sector, i.e. IBRD, will face the same issues. How can we work together and what alternatives there are to add on these things?
Wages for instance in Africa are an issue: we had a project in Ethiopia where we’ve convinced private sector to increase these, even though they are much lower due to national legislation.
Regarding risk assessment, we went from one (myself) to having at least 2 people for region in IFC. More capacity now. Still not enough. We have better tools: one of the issues were the voice of the workers, most of the time there’s no unions, those voices are the workers. Now there’re better tools to get that info from the workers. Some clients may not allow these tools to be used, but we’re doing better.
Implementation is where challenges are: we may be good at identifying risks but implementation is the issue. Illana mentioned leverage, for us leverage over client is disbursement process: although in the Environmental and Social Action Plan, which is disclosed, we ask for labour audits as part of the contract. We are trying to use the disbursement leverage in the design process to make these standards higher.
We are improving capacity building, not only from experts but also investment officers, as they are the ones who have the numbers, and information on the legal framework. They are training them to be the ones getting the info from the client.
Two additional points is that the CAO report also allows us, given the amount of information that it has, as input to the PS2 update, to the Society of Media Framework update, and that’s a discussion that we will continue collaborating.
We’ve been talking to ILO and unions to get info on the update of PS.
Capacity is still an issue.
Another think to note is the discrepancy between PSS and national legislation, as mentioned above.
The objective is to solve the issues on the ground and make it better in those projects the IFC and WBG is investing on. Getting the intel from the ground is very useful.
Importance of jobs to create prosperity in countries where we operate. Jobs are not about numbers, they are also about how good they are and how they increase the labour practises I the countries where we operate.
Questions and answers
Illana to Alex: a lot of the issues is about the implementation of the existing standard: will the update to the performance standards will actually make a difference for workers in the ground in IFC projects?
Alex: there’re lots of changes we need, we need more specificities about what it applies to, what workers are being included. I think one area that kind of came up both directly and obliquely in the conversation that I think is crucial to changing the implementation is changing the way the IFC kind of perceives of freedom of association. I think that it’s an issue that can’t be resolved simply between the client and the IFC, kind of because in its very nature. It’s about the right of workers and how to change the retaliation with their voices. Clear penalties for retaliation. Violations of freedom of association, by the time you assess the issues, it has already happened. You need a fast mechanism to bring the client to accountability. Trade union consultation: partnership with global unions federations is a key part of this. democratic representatives of workers unions should be there from the start. We can help projects be less risky, but we need to be there from the start to make these changes happen.
Illana: This is a question of engagement and also of transparency that folks know that the project is happening.
To Arun: question about what your repot finds on leverage, because there’s really a question of what the IFC can practically require of clients, because it’s one thing to require it in a policy, it’s another thing to enforce consequences for it not happening, and to require it in practice on the ground.
Arun: we also release a report on leverage, application and lack of it. We identified it as leverage deficit in our report. Two scenarios:
- at supervision stage: several times environment and social actions were related to disbursements. We observer in many times this were still incomplete. For instance, 11 out of 15 cases had those conditions attached to disbursements, and 9 out of 15 were either waived or extended, and disclosure was very minimum around that. So that was the first scenario at the supervision stage.
- management action pian after cases were brought to CAO: many times IFC could not implement management action plan because of lack of leverage.
Leverage needs to be planned from the design stage – design needs to plan what type of leverage can be used and what needs to be required. Preparedness stages need to include leverage discussion and records.
Second recommendations was to record level of leverage, there has to be an escalation and record of waivers and extensions. A particular level at the IFC and MIGA management needs to take those decisions because those are linked to ENS conditions, which basically get IFC leverage.
IFC needs to expand its leverage. Contractual leverage is one form of leverage but not all. IFC can pile new forms of leverage.
Preparedness stage is right, supervision is too late to use this leverage.
Illana to Larissa: I would like to ask about your new role as chief checker. The World Bank Group as part of the merger of the public and private sector side has created a new structure, the makers and the checkers. The makers set the environmental and social, I guess, processes for given projects, and the checkers are checking to see how, uh, this is going.
We hope some of these checkers will start to check these issues we’ve been mentioning, and make the leverage work.
Larissa: I report to a different line, independent of operations. Most of my findings are based on data. Main gaps identified in IFC: land, labour, working conditions, OHS, occupational health and safety and the third is about lack of stakeholders’ engagement.
Recent findings in public and private: in implementation we are not using the leverage we have the way we could we could be more forceable. There’s additional leverage, for instance when there’re additional financiers with us. Also we could design the projects in a way that we have more leverage with us. In certain markets IFC has less leverage than you would think we have. In several cases, the clients prepay, and they find other types of financing. There was no remediation. Having that design, at the design stage, and being better at including certain things also in the loan agreement is something that we need to be stronger
We got push from civil society to also think outside of the box. So, and that has also allowed us to move. But there are still a lot of gaps in terms of implementation.
Questions from the public
WJ Yao, Verite: First question is about job quality and outcomes. how does IFC independently verify outcomes? Does IFC’s results measurement framework include specific indicators of job quality, such as wages, working conditions? How does IFC independently verify these outcomes? Second question is on risk-based due diligence. As the IFC reviews its Sustainability Framework, is it considering alignment with OECD risk-based? Human rights due diligence framework, particularly regarding labour-specific risk assessments, meaningful worker engagement, and tracking the effectiveness of corrective actions and access to remedy. Third question is on implementation capacity. Is IFC considering more systematic engagement of external independent labour experts other than ILO and the unions? to support risk assessments, ongoing monitoring, and verification of actual worker outcomes, particularly in high-risk investments involving migrant workers.
Larissa: we use consultants in high-risk regions to assess risks, it’s not only internally or ILO. We use them also for training. We don’t have indicators on quality, when we update the PS is a risk based-approach and will try to align it to the new available tools.
Alex: on question of job quality, it’s important to note the Bank is working on its scorecard, which has a metric that try to assess quality of job, which we think is quite useful. They do intend to come up with kind of a metric that tracks more and better jobs. I think we find it’s very inadequate. It’s almost entirely just to kind of change in the kind of income divided by people affected by the project, so it does not intend to incorporate things like freedom of association, things like social protection, other kind of issues of job quality. They are consulting with the ILO on it, but it’s basically ILO kind of trying to work with them on ways to calculate these things, and the World Bank’s saying, we need a really simple number, so we’re not going to do that. But they are kind of talking about it. In terms of information disclosure, report findings are usually not disclosed.
Irum: quality of jobs is exactly why what our paper focus, it’s not about the numbers, it has to be quality, which comes with the dignity, which comes with the wages and contractual guardrails, and which also takes us to subcontractor issue, that those guardrails and those wages and those contractual stability. On the capacity, and that again goes to the quantity of the jobs, we also recommended that local expertise needs to be tapped into. There is local expertise available. There are actually countries where local expertise is not available, so IFC is also kind of at a loss that what to… but the places where local expertise is available, that goes to creation of jobs as well as tapping into that expertise, rather than looking into these international big experts.
Q2 anonymous: regarding complains from workers in south east Aisa: when big contactors get bigger projects they get involved in smaller subcontracting, etc, even when you give good orientation to the primary contractor, that does not guarantee the subcontracted companies will follow (also because there not oriented). Filling complaints should be easier, and speed should be better in grievances complaint processes. Also in terms of labour rights in countries where these are not aligned with ILO, the Bank is in a position to push for all bank-funded projects follow the universal ILO standards?
Larissa: yes, happening in all projects even in public sectors. We use experts for labour audits. Not as much on the public as we do in the private. A lot of the best practices we have developed in the private we will apply in the public sector. That’s an issue, not only on wages and overtime, and normal terms of employment, but also simple occupational issue (risk of fatality, labour, etc) which we also need to address in the public sector.
Regarding the checkers and makers: the World Bank Group has a direct complaint mechanism, which is a grievance redress mechanism, and the checkers, we are the owners of that mechanism, so any complaint from a project affected that complaints to the World Bank will come through that. We are the ones that manage that, so it’s not operations. We manage that process and then we engage with the complainants to try to see what the complaint is about and how we can work with them and the client to solve the issue. The checkers, we are around 90 people divided by regions, covering the four institutions. So we cover MIGA, IFC, IBRD, and IDA. So we cover all of the projects. The checkers are responsible for also dealing with direct complaints.
Alex: The subcontracting issue is really crucial here and points to one of these little kinds of reforms that are policy changes that we think could really change implementation. I think the performance standards language around contractors is currently quite weak, there’s a need to hold contracts accountable to the PS. We understand it’s not easy, but we do think it’s not unreasonably to expect these subcontractors to address to these principles. Protection provided to contractors need, workers need to trickle down to the supply chain and not just the primary level.
Illana: quality of jobs is key to our report, and this includes subcontractors. that also shows the uneven filed, between big contactors and small contractors. Local expertise needs to be included
Kirill, from Mongolia, Organization of Personal Disabilities: to what extent the persons with disabilities issue are addressed in your area that you work? Persons with disabilities is still included in the workforce and also, on the other hand, some persons acquire the impairment due to or as a result of the workplace status. To what extent this issue has been addressed, and what are your recommendations, uh, other points you would like to raise in this area?
Irum: when you talk of disability, I would like to go further step. I think it’s also not just people with disabilities, but generally larger vulnerable group, which includes protection of child labour, which includes women who are vulnerable. So gender action plans need to feed into worker protection plans as well. Labour standards, implementation plans, all this needs to be inclusive of these groups. We did not see any special protections around this, we need to improve all this, especially with, with climate-exasperated, uh, uh, risks, which put these vulnerable and disabled people to further risks, um, you know, where there’s a flood warning, or there is a mishap at the worker’s site.
Q from rep from Myanmar: I work on a case that was brought to the CAO. In 2024, IFC Board approved the Management Action Plan in response to CEO investigation which found policy violation. IFC failed to do its due diligence. But what happened is that the contract prepaid the loan. My question is, what happened when the decision came? I want to know what IFC thinking about stakeholder engagement, how should I engage with IFC?
Miria, WEMOS: health sector employs over 70 million people, majority women. When there’s understaffing and fair of retaliation also patients suffer and this all contributes to the risks. What are your thoughts when it comes to health sector and the new standards and whether health should be automatically considered high risk because of the risk of harming the vulnerable? I don’t know if there’re health cases in CAO. I would be very curious to know if there were any lessons on that.
Larissa: IFC did portfolio review of all health projects. We do not consider all automatically of high risk. We identify the findings and then the next time a healthcare project comes in, we tell the specialist that there are the things they need to look at. There are concerns of course. In terms of the CAO case, I didn’t recall, but I think it’s AWBA, AWBA, the Myanmar project. The client prepaid the loan I think five years ago. The IFC has no relationship with the client and there is zero leverage there.
In terms of partnerships, with CAO and also with the international unions has helped us in moving, and also as an ENS expert, it has helped me to make the case to our management of the importance of improving the risk assessments, of improving also the leverage, and also on getting more capacity on people, and for example, requiring labour audits. Ten years ago, labour audits was a no-go, so they were never going to happen.
Labour practices, instead of overall, instead of improving, are deteriorating, unfortunately. It’s the macroeconomic environment both in private and public sector.
Alex: trade unions overwhelmingly want IFC cases to happen and success and we just want workers to be sitting at the table with employers. Freedom of association and international human rights are key. If the IFC can insist with their clients on these frameworks that is what we ask for. We want that contact.
Irum: We did not see much of the health sector cases, but IFC has its own grievance redress mechanism as well, and they did, I think, receive some health sector. In terms of leverage, prepayment and losing leverage is one of the biggest issues. I think exits happened in two-thirds of CAO cases, which is, like, 10 out of 15, with compliance investigations, which is worrying.
