IMFC statements summary analysis Annual Meetings 2026
•
Article summary
The IMFC are a group of finance ministers responsible for setting the direction of the activities of the IMF. On their 54th meeting, they could not issue a joint statement amid increasing geopolitical rifts. However, there were a few individual statements submitted, including by the US, despite US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s absence at this year’s Annuals.
This is the ninth occasion in which IMFC members have been unable to release a joint communiqué and instead released individual statements. Chair, Mohammed Al Jadaan, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, whose term has been extended for a year, released a Chair’s statement which repeated IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva’s messaging from the World Economic Outlook (WEO), stressing global economic resilience and sustained growth despite repeated shocks. The statement also expressed the IMFC’s focus on “enabling broad-based, private sector-led growth, and strengthening resilience through credible policies and international cooperation.” On governance, as on previous occasions the statement reaffirmed “commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the centre of the Global Financial Safety Net.” It stressed the importance of states’ finalising the 16th General Review of Quotas (GRQ) “with no further delay” and stated that the Diriyah Guiding Principles will guide “future discussions on quota and governance reforms, including under the 17th GRQ.”
While the WEO’s topline messaging was widely thought to be aimed at appeasing the US (see Dispatch Annuals 2026), those of individual members revealed a more disjointed picture. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent did not attend the Meetings due to “domestic engagements” and the US’s absence, despite holding the G20 presidency, underscored increasing geopolitical rifts and fragmentation of multilateralism, with emerging markets and developing economies (EMDES) pushing back against the WEO position. The US released a statement on the Fund and Bank which repeated their position against either institution addressing “emerging areas” including climate, gender and inequality. It targeted the IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), stating that “continually expanding the Fund’s agenda such as financing provided through the Resilience and Sustainability Trust…lacks a clear linkage to balance of payments pressures and veers into development-policy lending” (See Inside the Institutions, What is the Resilience and Sustainability Trust). In the statement, Bessent referenced the World Bank’s IDA process and Mission 300, stressing the US’s support for financing oil, gas and nuclear energy projects. The statement also focussed on de-risking projects for the extraction of critical minerals and mobilising private capital. In addition, it repeated demands that the Fund should rationalise expenditure including “divest[ing] from the Bretton Woods Recreation Centre.”
The European Commission statement repeated the WEO messaging, focussing on the importance of reopening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and that measures to “alleviate the impact of high energy prices” should be “temporary and targeted.” The Europeans did take a position counter to the US on emerging issues to “highlight the Fund’s role on addressing cross-cutting issues such as climate change, gender, digitalization and artificial intelligence, based on macro-criticality”, and argued that “macro-critical climate risks must continue to be appropriately covered by the IMF” (see Observer Summer 2026).
The divergence in positions is most clearly underscored by Brazil’s statement, which differed from the WEO stressing that “growth is becoming increasingly lopsided, and the Sustainable Development Goals look ever more distant.”
It noted that “aggregate resilience increasingly reflects powerful investment trends concentrated in a few economies, rather than a broadly shared improvement in global economic conditions.” Brazil’s statement pointed to the Super El Niño as “a major source of risk…putting additional pressure on constrained national budgets.” It called on the IMF to take “renewed efforts to make sovereign debt resolution faster and more predictable,” and to “ensure that adjustment to global shocks does not fall disproportionately on countries with the least policy space, thereby aggravating unevenness.”
Brazil referred to the outcomes of the major policy review processes at the Fund (see Observer Autumn 2026), expressing that they “strongly support a more systematic integration of distributional analysis into bilateral surveillance, particularly in the assessment of fiscal policy,” and that the “IMF 2021 Climate Strategy should be upheld, including its numerical targets.” On the Review of Program Design and Conditionality (ROC), Brazil stated that “fiscal consolidation should be used with caution,” and argued that “the recommendation to run ex ante distributional impact analysis for countries entering programs is clearly a step in the right direction.” Finally, the statement called for continued work on “climate change, social inequality, gender disparities, and progressive taxation.” Brazil encouraged “enhanced engagement with civil society and academia, which is fundamental to increase the Fund’s legitimacy and reduce stigma.”
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s statement stressed the global consequences of “the ripple effects of the Middle East military escalation,” which “have been compounded by the impact of El Niño and financial volatility around the world. The statement from South Africa, which covered 14 other African countries, echoed the dangers of uneven growth concentrated in “economies benefiting from rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and favourable terms of trade.” In contrast to the WEO’s rosier outlook, it warned that “for many emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), including countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a correction in AI-related asset prices, further sharp rise in sovereign bond yields, or severe cyber incidents could trigger tighter global financing conditions, increased capital-flow volatility, and renewed pressures on market access and borrowing costs.” South Africa’s statement opposed the dilution of the Fund’s work on “climate-related risks that have already materialized in many SSA countries.” On debt, it stressed the launch of the “Global Borrowers’ Platform as a tangible expression of borrowers’ efforts to strengthen ownership, coordination, and collective engagement on sovereign debt challenges” (see Observer Summer 2026). South Africa opposed “excessive reliance on front-loaded fiscal consolidation,” which it argued “could risk weakening growth-enhancing investment, constraining essential social spending, and undermining program ownership.” Instead, it called for “explicit recognition of political economy constraints, stronger social and distributional analysis, closer alignment between reform objectives and implementation capacity, and earlier course correction when circumstances change.”
China is a member of the IMFC, yet their statement was not published. The People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng gave a press conference in Beijing during the Meetings focussed on bilateral surveillance, which warned of growing global imbalances. It countered the Managing Director’s statement earlier on in the week, which toed the US line against China’s export-led economy, by arguing against all “protectionist measures.”
