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Making adaptation count in debt sustainability analysis: Lessons for the LIC-DSF review

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Flyer of the CSPF session titled 'Making Adaptation Count in Debt Sustainability Analysis: Lessons for the LIC-DSF Review' at Annual Meetings 2026.
Flyer of the CSPF session titled 'Making Adaptation Count in Debt Sustainability Analysis: Lessons for the LIC-DSF Review' at Annual Meetings 2026.

Article summary

Notes from the Civil Society Policy Forum session titled, Making Adaptation Count in Debt Sustainability Analysis: Lessons for the LIC-DSF Review. Following the IMF and World Bank boards’ approval of the first reform of the Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF) in nearly a decade, this session explored what the new long-term climate module means for the roughly 70 countries assessed under it – and whether countries investing in adaptation and nature-based resilience will finally see the benefits of those investments, not just their costs, reflected in how their debt risks are judged.

Moderator

Panellists

A video recording of the event can be found here.


Frank: Last month, the executive boards of the World Bank and the IMF approved the first reforms of the LIC-DSF in nearly a decade, with ramifications for how risks are defined, priced and managed for the roughly 70 countries assessed under it. What excites The Nature Conservancy is that the reform could finally recognise the investments countries make in resilience. Last month, a single rain event caused some $360 million in damage in Thailand. Thailand’s own modelling suggests climate impacts could cost as much as 14 to 15 per cent of GDP, and that adaptation could recover four to five percentage points of that. These are the kinds of investments that, at scale, should count.

Chetan: Our partners’ policy brief, Incorporating Adaptation and Resilience into Macroeconomic Assessments, starts from the fact that the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) feeds right across the financial architecture – into financing plans, debt restructurings, rating agencies’ views and access to concessional finance. We call first for a more consistent and transparent way of calibrating resilience investments: in the IMF’s DIGNAD model, changing a single parameter for how much adaptation reduces disaster losses, from 25 to 65, shifts the GDP impact of a shock by four percentage points, and evidence such as mangroves cutting storm damage by 65 per cent can inform those assumptions. Second, we call for usability: the LIC-DSF template has more than 200,000 formula cells across 86 sheets, and countries need simpler tools to translate debt swaps, outcome bonds, parametric insurance and country platforms into the models.

Mark: Our first climate tool was too simple. It extended our ten-year forecasts to 40 years and added the cost of adaptation, but it merely extrapolated the baseline – when climate change in fact bends it downwards and makes it more volatile – and counted all of the costs and none of the benefits. Because there is no agreed long-term climate baseline, especially at country level, the new module instead shows a range of climate scenarios, with default settings that users can adjust. Costs are easy to enter, while for benefits we are building an interface that lets users bring in their own estimates of how an investment changes the baseline, using tools like DIGNAD, so the framework stays flexible across the huge range of possible investments. This is version two: we did not want the perfect to be the enemy of the good, and we are still working on how to stop users assuming away debt problems as the whole debt stock turns over, how to reflect countries’ rising debt-carrying capacity, and how to model contingent instruments and spreads. When we introduced our natural disaster stress test in 2017, such analyses went from two or three to 30 or 40 within a couple of years, and we hope for the same here.

The reform was not simple to agree. With 192 members and a consensus-based board, directors raised concerns from both sides: some feared the tool would understate climate risk, others that it would trigger downgrades and make borrowing for development harder. To thread that needle, the module does not mechanically affect the risk rating – it can inform the assessment where staff judge it appropriate – while building climate scenarios into the baseline reassured those worried that risks would be missed. We went to the board five or six times over three years, and there will be a version three.

Nicola: This involves a real trade-off between bringing more risk into the DSA and accurately representing the rewards of acting on it. Countries face growing fiscal pressure just as climate risks intensify: Grenada was downgraded after a disaster, investors are already raising rates for countries seen as climate-vulnerable or nature-depleted, and Bangladesh increasingly uses its concessional windows simply to respond to disasters. Because the old framework counted the costs of adaptation but not its benefits, countries were in effect penalised for investing in it. Yet those benefits flow through many channels – avoided damage and reconstruction costs, fewer contingent liabilities, protected revenues, lower borrowing costs and, with measures like agroforestry in Uganda, higher productivity. Work led by the government of Uganda showed that investments in agro-industrialisation and flood protection could almost offset rising climate risk. How the module is implemented will be critical, since the choice of baseline and whether climate is modelled as shocks rather than smooth trends shape the estimated benefits. We are also supporting a KPI-linked approach and TNC’s proposed calibration library, so a country investing in mangroves can see what that means for its risk profile, and working with NatureFinance on simple, open tools – so that countries are not left working out which number to change in row five, column 56 of a spreadsheet.

Mark: We already have these discussions through the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, but a good discussion requires both sides of the table to understand what they are dealing with, so training is the biggest constraint on our timeline. The Debt Management Facility is funding us to train the 70 or so countries that use the LIC-DSF, and we expect the new framework to go live perhaps in September next year. In country discussions, the first step is establishing which projects have a realistic chance of going ahead; once they are in, countries that have already done their homework are at a huge advantage, because the module relies on evidence of impact – and that evidence needs to be ready in time for the budget cycle. When plans exceed a country’s macroeconomic capacity and the investment budget has to be winnowed down, better-prepared projects with clearer benefits are more likely to survive. I would hope that in five years we have version three in place, many more countries using the module, and success stories where it convinced donors to provide more concessional finance.

Nicola: What is your vision for what this will look like in five years’ time, both within the DSF and in the support around it for countries?

Mark: I would hope to have version three up and running, and many more countries using the module – just as the natural disaster stress test went from two or three applications to 30 or 40. Above all, I would hope for success stories where it actually changed the decisions of those who finance, for instance by convincing donors that a project merits more concessional finance.

Questions and answers

Representative from Sri Lanka: A basic smell test of Sri Lanka’s figures would have shown four years ago that it had no capacity to absorb external shocks, and after four years of the IMF programme there is still no space for gender, climate or social needs. If the basic picture does not look plausible, adding complexity only makes it easier to lose sight of what is actually possible.

Mark: Sri Lanka’s sharp cut in income taxes was a policy error that contributed directly to its crisis, but I agree basic debt modelling still needs improvement. By mid-December we will publish supplementary guidance on using our framework for market-access countries in restructurings, ahead of a full review beginning in 2028.

Representative from Nepal: There are hard limits to adaptation. The disaster in Nepal in August pushed the country back 20 years and destroyed hydropower that took 15 to 20 years to build. How much can we fairly ask very poor countries to invest in adaptation that may never pay a dividend?

Nicola: Adaptation cannot solve every problem, but its limits are no reason not to do it – this is ultimately about people’s lives. Pre-arranged risk financing matters too, and for the DSA the key point is that countries should be rewarded for their preparations, not only penalised for their risks, because right now the system is almost set up against them.

Mark: Countries need information that puts adaptation on a level playing field with health or education, and because debt crises are exceptionally damaging to development, this analysis also helps fit their ambitions within their constraints.

Representative from Action Aid, Sierra Leone: Grassroots women live the consequences of unsustainable debt repayments every day, and the framework still asks how countries will repay rather than how they can repay while delivering their development agendas. How will it align with the UN framework on debt and the Common African Position?

Mark: The long-term module has a second branch, beyond climate, for evaluating spending on the Sustainable Development Goals, such as health and education, where costs come early and benefits later. You also raise one of the hardest questions in debt analysis: how much fiscal adjustment a country can make, or how much spending it needs. If fiscal policy is set too tight, development opportunities are lost, and getting it wrong in a restructuring is far more costly. The DSA has traditionally spoken about risk but not about space, and the module helps rebalance that.

Representative from Wemos: Would the Fund support a protected floor for climate resilience investment, like social spending floors, and loosen deficit targets if the module shows space for more adaptation?

Civil Society representative: Many countries spend almost all their revenue on debt service. Where will they find space for these investments, and should there be grants to support them?

Representative from UK based development institute: What are your views on debt pause clauses, debt swaps, and the UK’s proposal to mandate private creditor participation in debt deals?

Mark: A climate spending floor would need to be assessed as macro-critical, as social spending floors are, because without public acceptance there is no programme. The case for climate is harder, but I would not rule it out for countries at very high climate and disaster risk. For the first time in about a decade, more than half of countries are at low or moderate risk of debt distress; for the rest, this analysis matters even more because it helps match projects with the right financing, and for a country with no fiscal space, the conversation with donors becomes about grants. Having designed the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, under which no private creditors took part, I think pause clauses are useful, though the devil is in the details. Debt swaps are not for countries in restructuring, which need write-downs, but can help where grants are unavailable. Mandating private sector participation is a complicated topic that I will set aside today.

Nicola: Many of these questions go beyond what a spreadsheet can fix. The IMF has provided a flexible toolkit, but the proof will be in how the IMF, the World Bank, creditors, countries, civil society and investors use it to decide which projects to finance and how. The forthcoming guidance is the big next step, and our community needs to provide the evidence that this work requires. And yes, countries should get grants to help them do it.

Sam: As co-chair of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, I have just launched a guide on how finance ministers can put climate action at the centre of fiscal management, and these tools are exactly what that work needs. The DSA shapes our fiscal space and how creditors and investors see us. Uganda is investing seriously in adaptation, but while we can model risks such as drought and floods, the long-term benefits of adaptation are not clearly captured in the frameworks. We are working with LSE, NatureFinance and others to model the benefits of agroforestry and agro-industrialisation, and extending this through the coalition to Zambia, Ethiopia and beyond. When we ask parliament to approve borrowing, the critical question is what that debt is for – and the answer should be informed by evidence.