We have an axe to grind with the World Bank on Africa’s electrification
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Article summary
Mission 300 is a joint World Bank and African Development Bank initiative to connect 300 million Africans to electricity by 2030, launched in April 2024. In June, the two banks announced they had reached 50 million people. There are three problems with this claim. First, the count begins on 1 July 2023, nine months before Mission 300 existed, and takes into account projects approved years earlier, so older results are folded into a new brand in a way that makes it hard to determine what new impetus it is contributing. Second, in the countries showcased, the figures come overwhelmingly from programmes financed long before the initiative: Tanzania’s rests on a project approved in 2016, Nigeria’s on one from 2018. Third, connections are counted without publishing what quality of supply it delivers, so a household with a few hours of power looks identical to one with a reliable service. In the absence of reasonable adjustments, a “connection” might not mean much from an energy poverty alleviation or socioeconomic improvement standpoint.
On 16 June, the World Bank Group (WBG) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) told the world that Mission 300 – a joint initiative between the two banks with a goal to connect 300 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa to electricity by 2030 – had already connected over 50 million people to electricity, at nearly double the pre-launch pace. For those who considered Mission 300 to be about energy infrastructure, the speed felt miraculous. Rarely are powerplants and grids built at such velocity.

Eight days later, on 24 June, the World Bank co-published the latest Tracking SDG 7 report. That second document, funded by the Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), recorded that 655 million people still lack access to electricity, and that Sub-Saharan Africa’s progress “has slowed significantly.” It additionally noted that the global access rate stagnated at 92 per cent in 2024 with annual growth halved against the previous decade, and that the rural access deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from 376 million people in 2010 to 447 million in 2024. The AfDB’s co-authored 2026 Africa Sustainable Development Report reinforces the point by observing that “SDG 7 is one of the few SDGs experiencing a regressive trend [in Africa].”
A tale of two reports
It is hard to reconcile such starkly different images about the same continent: while one says the pace of progress measured by the performance of the AfDB’s co-created flagship energy initiative has doubled, the other recognises the pace of improvement must now triple to reach universal access by 2030 because it has been slowing or even regressing.
In an attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction, we have now spent several weeks auditing Mission 300’s “50 million beneficiaries” claim. We read the implementation status reports behind the headline numbers across the showcase countries, recomputed the AfDB tracker from its own published code and database, traced contract awards, and cross-checked against national audit findings and utility accounts. We published the results on 22 June to demonstrate that the numbers simply don’t add up. WBG and AfDB replied through two of their energy directors, and we entered a second phase of our analysis on 30 June.
Something useful has come out of that exchange: the Mission 300 Progress Portal was quietly revised on 20 July. It now separates three categories instead of the previous blended figure. These are: people actually connected, people forecast to be connected through approved operations, and people forecast to be connected through planned operations not yet approved. The portal is much clearer now about how it tracks these “to distinguish between verified results and forward-looking projections.” We are grateful for the World Bank’s listening ear.
The AfDB deserves similar credit for publishing its tracker code and underlying workbook at all. That decision is what made an independent audit possible in the first place. I have on occasion criticised other regional multilateral banks like the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), for their lack of transparency. AfDB has denied me room for another complaint.
But the most critical issue remains unresolved. The definition of “People Connected” on the revised portal is word for word what it was before: the total connected through World Bank Group operations “active or closed” during a reporting period dating from 1 July 2023, or nine months before Mission 300 came into existence. There is still no split between connections from operations approved after the April 2024 launch of Mission 300 (see Observer Summer 2024) and those inherited from earlier ones.

There is still no published bridge from the July 2023 baseline to any country figure. Nor is there any downloadable country-level ledger that would let analysts outside of the institutions recompute the headline. Separating forecasts from delivered results doesn’t go far enough. Were the Banks to report additionality linked to Mission 300, we would be getting somewhere. But so far, no luck.
The banks do accept that connections from the earlier pipeline count in full provided they fall after the 2023 start date. We take that candour in good faith. But candour about method is not additionality, and it does not address the confusion caused by a release announcing that the pace has nearly doubled.
This brings us to the strangest feature of the World Bank’s current position. It published a major review of its Multi-Tier Framework in the same period it was issuing the now controversial release about having connected 50 million Africans to electricity.
The Multi-Tier Framework, developed by ESMAP, was designed specifically to replace binary access metrics with a six-tier system measuring capacity, reliability, affordability and safety. In March, ESMAP released a synthesis of a decade of MTF surveys, 29 of them across 27 countries. Its findings read almost as a rebuttal of the Mission 300 scoreboard. The report describes “a substantial divergence between physical connectivity and high-quality service.” It records that off-grid solar access, for example, is dominated by entry-level products such as solar lanterns “which often fail to meet even the Tier 1 performance threshold.” It says the accumulated data should let governments and partners “move beyond mere connection counts toward evaluating the performance of the energy supply.” Precisely our point too.
Yet, ESMAP describes itself, without any hint of irony, as “the engine behind Mission 300,” and it has put $71 million of co-financing into Mission 300 operations. So, one arm of the World Bank has built the leading instrument for showing why binary connection counts are inadequate, while the flagship initiative it powers reports in precisely those counts. In defence, it is argued that only connections at Tier 1 or above are being counted, and that Tier 0 products are excluded. But even granting that point does not save the day. Tier 1 means four hours of supply a day, one of them in the evening. Clearly a floor for counting, rather than a threshold for transformation. And no tier distribution is published for any country in Mission 300 stats, so the floor cannot be checked from outside – least of all in Nigeria, where the total is delivered entirely off-grid.
The MTF data for Ethiopia illustrates the cost of this confusion. In August 2025 the Bank approved a $400 million Accelerating Sustainable and Clean Energy Access Transformation (ASCENT) operation for Ethiopia and justified it with the MTF finding that the country’s Tier 1 and above access rate stood at 44 per cent, leaving close to 71 million people “still living without a sufficient level of access to this essential service.” Ten months later the same institution booked 4.6 million Ethiopians as Mission 300 beneficiaries but studiously refused to confirm which tier they had been connected at.
These two figures are not simply different. They cannot be added, subtracted or placed on the same axis. Beneficiaries connected under Mission 300 may well be among those 71 million people the Bank’s own survey classes as underserved. But how are we to know when Mission 300 reporting is so superficial? It looks as if service quality is invoked when the Bank needs to demonstrate need, and quickly and quietly dropped when it wants to demonstrate progress.
We consider this as the clearest available evidence that the Bank’s monitoring reform is running well behind its monitoring capability.
What it looks like on the ground
Uganda, a country we had not examined in the earlier rounds, shows what that lag looks like on the ground right now. The $608 million Electricity Access Scale-up Project was approved in 2022 and became effective on 20 July 2023, 20 days after the Mission 300 counting window opened. The project’s connections are thus fully countable toward the Mission 300 initiative target despite the project predating it entirely.
On 3 August, Uganda’s Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, working from an Auditor General review, put on record that only 25,906 beneficiaries had been connected in nearly three years. The Energy Ministry has since told Parliament that the figure is 235,906 one-pole and no-pole connections as of June, alongside 420,000 off-grid solar systems. That is a discrepancy of 210,000 beneficiaries that remains unresolved. What is not disputed is that the project had disbursed $190.8 million, 31.3 per cent of its envelope, with ten months left before it closes in June 2027, and that a fire at Amber House destroyed bid documents, forcing a cancelled procurement and delayed re-tendering. None of that “ground-level” chaos is discernible from Mission 300 reporting.
On 6 August, three days after the parliamentary revelation, the World Bank published a feature titled Powering Progress: Expanding Electricity Access in Uganda, reporting that 479,194 women and girls had already been reached under the project. It is not so much that the feature is false, as it is about the misleading narrative that a casual reader is left with: it’s as though the worrying audit does not exist. Which, in turn, raises fundamental questions about whether the World Bank’s public communications can be reconciled with its more technical monitoring and evaluation reporting. It also tests the assurance that every counted connection rests on verified, connection-level evidence. In Uganda, when a national auditor looked for that evidence, two numbers emerged an order of magnitude apart.
Meanwhile, the earlier findings continue to rattle. In Nigeria, the June 2026 status report for the Distributed Access Through Renewable Energy Scale-Up Project (DARES), the one genuinely post-launch programme, records 5.292 million people reached, 1.046 million solar home systems deployed, 67 isolated mini-grids commissioned, and zero interconnected mini-grids commissioned. The report attributes performance “largely” to stand-alone solar, and the programme’s manual describes it as the successor to a 2018 project, complete with a legacy disbursement window migrating 27 companies and 148 pre-existing sites into the new accounting. In Tanzania, the 7.5 million connections figure rests on a programme approved in 2016 that had electrified 12,301 of 12,318 villages by the end of 2024. Neither picture has changed since we published. Yet, the banks, two months on, have still not provided the bridge that would validate the larger claim that connections are accelerating as a result of Mission 300.
That pace-arithmetic is, even when we take the claimed figures at face value, contentious. In September 2025, the World Bank Group President Ajay Banga put the Mission 300 total at 30 million. The portal recorded 32 million on the Bank’s side through the end of that month. By June 2026 the joint figure was 50 million (World Bank = 45 million; AfDB = 5.2 million). Is the claim that the pace of connections was doubling at the time of the announcement supported by the data? The table below can help us unpack.

It is clear from the table that the announcement’s claim of pace-doubling is at odds with the significant slowdown in the last quarter before the announcement.
What we are asking for
None of this means Mission 300 is a total failure or a fiction. Coordination has value. The National Energy Compacts initiated under Mission 300 have pulled 48 governments into a shared policy direction. ASCENT, the $5 billion multi-country programme that the WBG and AfDB describe as the leading vehicle for delivering the Mission 300 target, is reaching effectiveness across Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania and others. Those operations may well produce the genuine step change the 2028 forecasts anticipate.
Our argument, however, is that the reporting cannot presently distinguish between what Mission 300 caused and what it inherited, and, most crucially, whether it is really adding any value yet.
We are simply asking for each country figure to be published in a reconciliation ledger showing the July 2023 baseline, plus the window delta, approval and effectiveness dates, first disbursement, verified connection date, instrument type, the household multiplier used, and a quality tier drawn from the Bank’s own Multi-Tier Framework.
Moreover, headline figures should be recomputable from published records. Where a public number cannot be reproduced from an open dataset, as with the AfDB’s 5.2 million against a repository that yields 1.31 million, the discrepancy must be transparently resolved.
Why can’t the WBG and AfDB pair each national delivery unit with an independent panel of auditors, researchers and civil society monitors to sample-verify and to dissent?
Ultimately, a “connection” is a meaningless statistic unless it is linked with the elimination of energy poverty and the transformation of electricity into industrialisation outcomes across Africa.
Reporting must simply show us how many Africans have life-transforming electricity today who would not have had it without Mission 300. So far, we are not getting that, and we are determined that we should.

