Briefings

IFI governance

Analysis

IMF Governance Update

Information on processes and opportunities for influencing the IMF's governance structures.

15 February 2001 | Briefings

WB/IMF roles

Analysis

Structural Adjustment for the IMF

Examines representation and power issues relating to the IMF’s Board, staff and management. Identifies and discusses reform proposals.

19 January 2001 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

New Development Tools or Empty Acronyms?

The reality behind the Comprehensive Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (2000).

18 September 2000 | Briefings

WB/IMF roles

Analysis

A Crisis Of Identity? Conflicting Roles For The IMF

Two forces for change have converged on the IMF in recent years. The first is in relation to the financial crisis that swept across the globe in 1997 and 1998. The second has arisen from the pressure for debt cancellation to be linked to poverty reduction objectives and the acceptance that structural adjustment policies have failed to achieve lower levels of poverty.

18 September 2000 | Briefings

WB/IMF roles

Analysis

Comments on the paper “Making The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (EVO) Operational&

The Bretton Woods Project welcomes the establishment of an EVO.

18 September 2000 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing

In January 1999, Wolfensohn revealed the Comprehensive Development Framework, which frames his agenda for the Bank. This is a short examination of some of the issues raised by this announcement (July 1999).

14 June 2000 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

The IMF’s Final Frontier? Assessing “Second Generation” Reforms

The “second generation” reforms are aimed at implementing policies for the common good, particularly social policies that will help to alleviate poverty and provide more equal opportunity. It would appear that the IMF views itself no longer as simply an institution to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation objectives but is focused much more on structural issues, issues which have previously been the remit of the World Bank (1997).

14 June 2000 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

ESAF, Surviving The Spotlight?

The IMF has taken few steps to openly evaluate its operations. To try to remedy this situation, and in response to non-governmental organisations’ calls for a fully independent review mechanism, the IMF executive board decided to establish an ad hoc external review mechanism on a trial basis (1998).

14 June 2000 | Briefings

Social services

Analysis

Social principles: an update

When the social principles were proposed by Gordon Brown at the 1998 AGM of the Bank and IMF it was envisaged that they would apply to all countries and would be monitored as the other codes on Fiscal Transparency, Monetary Policy and Corporate Governance will be. The Development Committee charged the World Bank with the task of drawing up the principles (1999).

14 June 2000 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

The IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility: What Role for Development?

Although it has sought to adapt, the Fund still has particular difficulties in dealing effectively with low income countries. The introduction of ESAF was an important attempt at adaptation but its programmes are still too short term, the scale of support is often too small, and the policy conditions laid down are too blinkered.

14 June 2000 | Briefings

Conditionality

Analysis

What Role for the Multilateral Institutions, Donors, and NGOs in the New Framework for Poverty Eradi

This paper considers how the relationships and roles of intenational and national non-governmental organisations, donors and the multilateral institutions are likely to change as a result of new initiatives to put poverty reduction and country ownership at the centre of the development process (2000).

14 June 2000 | Briefings

WB/IMF roles

Analysis

Beyond Meltzer

This briefing is a response to the “Meltzer Report” produced by the US congressional Committee led by Allan Meltzer on the roles of the IMF and World Bank. It examines the Committee’s recommendations and outlines why they are inappropriate and how they would actually increase the power of the IMF, whilst turning it into an institution that would serve the needs of private sector investors rather than assisting governments (2000).

14 June 2000 | Briefings