

# Climate Investment Funds Monitor 8

October 2013

## Summary

- A proposal on how to assess new potential **Climate Investment Fund (CIF)** pilot countries is due to be discussed. Submissions have been shortlisted for the PPCR, FIP and SREP private sector set-asides. The CIF evaluation's interim report included concerns on gender and country ownership, as well as lessons for the UN's Green Climate Fund, but was criticised by the MDBs and the CIF administrative unit.
- The proposed **Clean Technology Fund (CTF)** "global private sector program" was questioned and a revised proposal will be discussed in the October meeting. A proposal for additional funding for gender assessments in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Turkey was criticised. Revised investment plans for Vietnam, Colombia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the MENA region were approved despite some concerns. Approval of India's Himachal Pradesh Development Policy Loan project was postponed due to further questions. Geothermal energy projects were put forward in Mexico, Chile and Indonesia.
- Haiti's Strategic Program for Climate Resilience has been approved under the **Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)**. Proposals for the private sector set-aside funding will be discussed. A grant management facility for Cambodian CSOs has been developed. Concerns around resettlement risks were raised on projects in Cambodia, Samoa and Tonga. Watershed and river basin projects were approved in Nepal, Zambia and Bolivia, despite some delays and concerns raised. Funding for airport development in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was questioned.
- Peru's **Forest Investment Program (FIP)** investment plan is due to be endorsed at the November meeting despite criticism from Peruvian indigenous peoples' organisations. Indonesian civil society groups criticised the absence of consultation and dialogue over the country's investment plan. Funding has been approved for projects in Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Project approvals have been delayed in Burkina Faso. The final framework operation guidelines for the Dedicated Grant Mechanism for Indigenous Peoples were endorsed. Preparation funding was approved for Brazil and Ghana.
- Tanzania's **Scaling up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP)** investment plan was endorsed despite queries from donors and civil society over the high level of expected private sector investment. Liberia is due to present its investment plan for endorsement at the November meeting.

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This edition of the *CIFs Monitor* outlines recent developments at the CIFs and collates on-going concerns over their operation. It builds on [CIFs Monitor 7](#), published in April 2013. This edition reports on CTF trust fund committee and SCF programme sub-committee meetings and communications from April to mid October 2013. These committees serve as the governing bodies of the funds. Information on the CIFs, including meeting notes and submissions, can be accessed at [www.climateinvestmentfunds.org](http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org).

For past issues of the *CIFs Monitor* see <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/publication-type/cifs-monitor/>


# 1 Climate Investment Funds

## 1.1 Criteria for CIFs expanding

Despite the CIF's 'sunset clause' requiring their dissolution once a new architecture for climate finance is in place, 70 more countries have expressed interest in accessing CIF funding according to the CIF 2012 annual report. In the October/November meetings the different funds will discuss the proposal *Approaches and criteria for considering potential new countries*. The proposal recommends principles to guide the selection process, including for it to be "transparent and based on clear criteria"; "contribute to the core objectives of the program"; "take into account the need to generate lessons"; and "have the potential to successfully implement the CIF programs and achieve expected impacts."

Furthermore, the paper proposes two options for steps to select new countries, to be agreed on in the meeting. In both options, an agreement for new countries to join would first need to be agreed, followed by approval of selection criteria and a scorecard template. The main difference is that under the first option a call for an expression of interest would be issued to countries meeting CIF general and programme-specific eligibility criteria, while under the second option countries on the approved list would be invited to prepare a "lighter version" of an investment plan.<sup>1</sup>

**Graph 1: Total CIF investment plans endorsed and projects approved 2009 – 2013<sup>2</sup>**



### Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) explained

The World Bank-housed Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) are financing instruments designed to pilot low-carbon and climate-resilient development through the multilateral development banks (MDBs). They are comprised of two trust funds – the **Clean Technology Fund (CTF)** and the **Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)**. The SCF is an overarching fund aimed at piloting new development approaches. It consists of three targeted programmes: **Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)**, **Forest Investment Program (FIP)** and **Scaling up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP)**.

The CIFs operate in 48 countries worldwide. As of end June, donors had pledged \$5.2 billion to the CTF and \$2.4 billion to the SCF (\$1.3 billion for PPCR, \$639 million for FIP and \$524 million for SREP). Projects are executed by multilateral development banks (MDBs): the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank's middle income arm, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD,) and its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Under the 'sunset clause' the CIFs are due to end once a new climate finance architecture is effective under the UNFCCC through a mechanism such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

## 1.2 CIF evaluation

The CIF evaluation<sup>3</sup> launched in 2012 aims to assess the development and organisational effectiveness of the CIFs and to document lesson learning for “the benefit of the Green Climate Fund” (see *CIFs Monitor* 7, 6). This includes analysis across nine thematic areas: relevance; efficacy; efficiency, financial additionality, and leverage; sustainability; CIF governance and management; administrative efficiency; national planning and consultation processes; monitoring and evaluation; and safeguard mechanisms.

A June inception report set out the scope of the evaluation, data collection methods and the key areas of interest. The final draft evaluation report will be prepared based on desk-based research and country visits between July and October 2013. From early December it will be open for comments from the trust fund committees and sub-committees, CIF administrative unit, MDBs, and observers. The final version of the report is expected to be completed by the end of December.

A July final interim report<sup>4</sup> included key preliminary findings on the different funds. On the CTF the report noted that “just three investment plans mention poverty reduction or cost savings for low-income households. These data make it difficult to see how CTF is prioritising investments that ‘help accelerate access to affordable, modern energy or transport services for the poorest.’ ” On gender it noted that the CIF gender review “found that gender considerations in programmes supported by the CTF are generally overlooked in both the strategic planning outlined through the country investment plans and in the project planning outlined in the individual project and programme documents. This is perhaps not surprising as there is no mention of gender in the CTF guidelines for investment plans.”

Whilst acknowledging that in some countries there was a clear link between the PPCR and existing national adaptation plans, the final interim report noted “in yet other countries — although consultations have taken place to develop the SPCR [Strategic Program for Climate Resilience] — there is not clear evidence in the SPCRs that PPCR has catalysed national dialogue sufficiently to develop a national vision for transformational change. Instead, these SPCRs seem to directly borrow the language from the PPCR design and guidance documents. In these countries, the SPCRs seem to have struggled with the ideal of being country-led.”

On FIP it noted “The FIP guidelines alone do not provide solid guidance on how to identify programmatic interventions that will have a good likelihood of delivering reduced GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhanced forest carbon stocks on a larger scale.” It did conclude that “the majority of the programs or projects in the reviewed seven pilot countries are justified (in FIP plans) as being transformative”. It also said further work was needed to validate whether there were co-benefits for forest dependent communities in livelihoods and biodiversity conservation.

On SREP the final interim report noted that: “In Africa, the majority of the population resides in rural areas with very little electrical power infrastructure”, concluding that “to address poverty it must invest in increasing energy access in rural areas targeting productive (including household) uses of electrical energy.”

In an October response the MDBs and the CIF administrative unit raised concerns that no opportunity was provided to “correct facts and clarify technical issues before the publication of the report.” Furthermore, they emphasised “major achievements of the CIF partnership”, including its contribution to scaled up climate finance. Under “clarifications and areas of improvement” they argued that while the report correctly identified that “transformation is an important long term goal” for the CIFs, it gave it “undue emphasis”, since it is only “one of several overarching goals”. While they recognised that there is no “strict definition of transformation” but it varies “in different contexts and circumstance”, they asked the evaluators to “clarify how they are interpreting “transformation” in their assessment of the CIF investment plans.” They also criticised a number of other details in the report, such as the questioning “of the role of MDBs in development of CIF policy and strategy documents”, instead underlining “the importance and usefulness of the close collaboration”. They also disagreed with the interim reports’ caution that “lessons learnt from CIF project implementation may be too late to influence the design of the Green Climate Fund [GCF]”, arguing instead that “lessons learned in the evolution of the CIF institutional structure and operational procedures could be useful for the design of the GCF”<sup>5</sup>

### 1.3 Gender review

A final version of the CIFs gender review<sup>4</sup>, discussed at the previous joint CTF/SCF meeting in November 2012, (see *CIFs Monitor 7*), was approved at the April meeting.<sup>6</sup> One of the few changes made to the final document was to extend the gender scorecard to all funds “to help advance gender equality across the entirety of the CIFs”, rather than just CTF and SREP. The scorecard will be used to judge if the CIFs are meeting minimum standards on gender and promoting gender mainstreaming. It was also agreed that a gender specialist will be hired to provide support (technical, priority setting, monitoring and evaluation) to CIF stakeholders to mainstream gender and to develop a CIF Gender Action Plan.

### 1.4 Civil society observers

At the April meeting civil society observers (see Annex page 28) were invited to submit a proposal and budget for the CIFs observer strategy for consideration at the November meeting. The proposal argues civil society engagement and its contribution is crucial given that the “CIF is moving from designing of investment plans to implementation”<sup>7</sup>. An indicative budget is presented for a total of \$174,500. \$20,000 of this would be for a consultant to prepare a document on how to enhance stakeholder engagement at the country level by the 2014 CIF spring meetings.

According to the proposal the benefits of this engagement would be increased transparency, sharing of best practice and coordination. The document proposes observer consultations prior to CIF meetings, increased capacity building for observers, strengthening of coordination between the CIF observers and national stakeholders, meaningful engagement of stakeholders at regional level, translation of CIF decisions and documents, and resources to cover developed country observers travel costs.

### 1.5 Private sector engagement

The efforts to increase private sector engagement in the CIFs have made further progress. Calls for proposals for the new private sector set-asides for the PPCR, FIP and SREP, to facilitate an increased share of funding to the private sector through a competitive process, were launched after the May meetings. The first set of applicants has been assessed by appointed expert teams, and the nominees will be discussed for final approval in the October/November sub-committee meetings. Most have requested loans rather than grants.

For PPCR, one regional and six country proposals have been shortlisted for approval, a further four were recommended with conditions (see page 16). For FIP, four proposals have been shortlisted, with a further four recommended, subject to further information (see page 20). For SREP, six proposals have been shortlisted, with a further three requiring further work, and subject to further funding becoming available (see page 25). However, CTF’s proposal for a “global private sector programme” raised concerns in the May meeting and has been revised into a Dedicated Private Sector Programs proposal with suggested sub-programmes for discussion and decision on which ones to move forward with in the October meeting (see page 9).

### Update on the Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The GCF is due to be fully operational by 2014, with an aim to channel \$100 billion in climate finance a year from 2020, but so far just \$9 million has been pledged and \$7.5 million has been deposited. There is still a lack of clarity about where funds will come from and whether they will be sufficient for developing countries mitigation and adaptation needs.

At its last meeting in Paris in early October the GCF board made decisions on the initial results areas and on performance indicators. The GCF board decided the results management framework should include “measurable, transparent, effective and efficient indicators” on “how the fund addresses economic, social and environmental development co-benefits and gender sensitivity”.

Ahead of the Paris meeting nearly 200 civil society organisations sent a letter to the GFC board calling for developed countries to meet their obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to provide climate finance and said this should be for a “shift to sustainable, equitable low-carbon development pathways”. The letter specifically mentioned the importance of the ‘do no harm’ principle, respect for human rights, transparency and recommended that investments should not go via international financial intermediaries.<sup>8</sup>

## 2 Clean Technology Fund

### 2.1 Delay in project submissions

In the May trust fund meeting concerns were raised about the significant number of projects scheduled for submission during financial year (FY) 2013 that have not been submitted. It noted the calendar for 2014 and urged the MDBs and countries to submit the proposals within the proposed timeline. It also noted that a number of investment plans have been revised recently, with more expected to be updated or revised in the next six months, and asked for this to be done in a timely manner. To speed up approval of projects, a proposal to strengthen the project pipeline management was discussed and it was agreed to introduce a pipeline for projects in endorsed investment plans.

The committee also noted expressions of interest in joining CTF from Costa Rica, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru and Uruguay. The CIF administrative unit, with assistance from the MDB committee, was tasked to prepare “a paper on a range of approaches and criteria and a transparent process” to guide the committee in decision making on potential new pilot countries (see page 4).

### 2.2 Local currency lending near agreement

In the May meeting, the committee requested the MDBs “to explore options for deploying CTF resources for local currency lending in private sector programmes/projects in a cost efficient manner.” It advised that the paper should include a menu of tools and instruments to mitigate risks and the expected costs, fees and expenses, how these would be borne among the CTF contributors, whether amendments would be necessary to any legal documents, as well as a proposed process for approval. The subsequent August paper proposed that up to \$50 million in CTF resources “may be used by MDBs for local currency lending without putting in place foreign exchange risk mitigation measures”. The CTF would bear “residual losses from foreign exchange rate fluctuation”, subject to conditions of the proposed tools outlined in further detail in the proposal. Whilst most donors were positive, due to several questions being raised about the details of the tools, the proposal will be further discussed in the October meeting.

#### Clean Technology Fund (CTF) explained

The objective of the CTF is to use minimum levels of concessional financing to catalyse investment opportunities that will reduce emissions in the long term. The CTF focuses on financing projects in middle-income and fast-growing developing countries.

The trust fund committee endorsed 13 investment plans in Phase I (2008-2010): Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Philippines; and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) covering Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. A further three plans have been endorsed in Phase II (after 2010): Nigeria, India and Chile. Furthermore, expressions of interest to join CTF have been received from Costa Rica, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru and Uruguay.

As of end June, \$5.2 billion had been pledged to the CTF, out of which \$2.4 billion has been approved for projects and programmes. 16 investment plans had been approved for a total amount of proposed funding of \$5.6 billion.



### 2.3 Private sector proposal to be discussed

The proposal for the establishment of a “global private sector programme” (see *CIFs Monitor 7*) was discussed in the May meeting where several concerns were raised, in particular regarding the suggestion to open up the programme to countries outside the CTF, leading one participant to ask whether a new CIF was being proposed. It was agreed that the proposal would be revised, to be discussed at the October meeting. This includes developing suggested sub-programmes for current CTF countries using \$150 million of CTF funds. Issues to be considered include country ownership, governance and project selection criteria.


The subsequent October paper, renaming the proposal *Dedicated Private Sector Programs (DPSP)*, outlines four sub-programmes and requests the committee to choose which ones to develop further:

- “Utility-scale renewable energy” to “catalyse a global funding effort to scale up renewable energy, starting with a focus on utility-scale geothermal energy”;
- “Risk capital to address regulatory risks for renewable energy” that will use “a targeted approach to address risks posed by uncertainties arising from a regulatory regime”;
- “Renewable energy mini-grids and distributed power generation ... to leverage private investment to fill financing gaps and to promote the wide-spread development of renewable energy mini-grids to serve rural and under-served off-grid communities”;
- “Climate finance equity investments ... to engage institutional and private equity investors to fill financing gaps encountered in climate change mitigation and low-carbon development.”

### 2.4 Extra funding for gender assessments questioned

Proposals to finance consultants to carry out gender assessments of CTF projects being implemented by the EBRD in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Turkey were circulated by mail in September. The proposed additional funding amounted to \$84,000 for Kazakhstan, \$56,000 for Ukraine and \$160,000 for Turkey. The requests were challenged by Canada, Sweden and Spain who asked the EBRD to withdraw the proposals as the EBRD seems already to have procedures in place for gender mainstreaming in those countries, so it was unclear why they were coming to the CTF for funding. While Germany “appreciated the efforts”, they asked for further details and emphasised that they did not want this to “set a precedent for future projects”, noting that “a gender differentiated approach should be included in all project designs from the beginning.”

**Graph 2: CTF funding<sup>9</sup>**



## 2.5 CTF projects not attracting carbon finance

The May meeting reviewed two documents on carbon markets, which concluded that carbon market financing only forms a small portion of total CTF project co-financing. According to the papers, “CTF projects are operating in sectors and locations that are able to attract commercial finance but that are not routinely financed in [Clean Development Mechanism] operations.”

## 2.6 Programme updates

### 2.6.1 Mexico: scrapping energy efficiency project, boosting geothermal<sup>10</sup>

At the committee meeting in May, Mexico put forward a proposal for revision of its investment plan, including reallocation of funds. This included decreasing the CTF allocation for the IFC private sector wind development programme from \$30 million to \$15.6 million. The proposal also suggested dropping the IFC private sector energy efficiency programme - which has an indicative allocation of \$20 million - and reallocating \$34.4 million from these programmes to a new IDB project on geothermal exploration risk reduction, scheduled for submission in December. The total CTF allocation remained at \$500 million, but the potential for GHG emissions savings fell by almost half.

Germany requested a detailed explanation of the significant decrease of almost \$1 billion in co-financing from the IBRD and the IDB, which is to be compensated by a \$1.4 billion increase in private co-financing. It also questioned the transformational impact of the geothermal project, given that Mexico is already one of the leading producers of geothermal energy. The MDBs responded that the reduction was due to a number of reasons, including project amendments as well as an original miscalculation in one of the projects. On the geothermal project, the MDBs recognised Mexico’s role and clarified that the project “will be exclusively targeted at private sector projects and developers which are interested in developing geothermal energy projects but are reluctant to incur the extremely high first costs associated with exploration.”

Proposed changes to the investment plan also included an amendment to a private sector energy efficiency programme which was approved in early September. This included expanding the beneficiaries to include financial intermediaries other than commercial banks, and including behind-the-meter small-scale renewable energy as an additional eligible technology. In addition, \$2 million of the funds were reallocated to the IDB FIRA (Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura, a group of agriculture related trust funds managed by Mexico’s central bank) green line project.

Furthermore, Mexico has put forward a request for \$300 million in additional financing for a phase II investment plan including new areas on cogeneration, electricity generation from forest residues and vehicle substitution, which will be discussed in the October committee meeting.

### 2.6.2 Vietnam: shifting resources from private sector to urban transport, grid efficiency<sup>11</sup>

Vietnam’s revised investment plan was approved in mid-October. The revised plan included dropping the \$50 million ADB industrial energy efficiency project, to be reallocated to the urban transport programme, and decreasing the IFC private sector financing programme from \$70 million to \$8.6 million, with \$60.4 million going to a new ADB grid efficiency project and \$1 million for a new component on monitoring and evaluation. The UK noted the diversion of funds away from the private sector programme and asked that “the figures for private leverage associated with CTF investment plans be amended so that expected results from the CTF are as accurate and transparent as possible.” Germany broadly welcomed the revisions, but asked Vietnam to “explore opportunities for integrating a gender sensitive approach.”

Prior to this, a \$49 million ADB urban metro project was approved in September. The UK raised a number of questions, including proposed actions to deal with the identified “increased risk of HIV/AIDS with the influx of construction workers for the project” and the need for an adequate budget for relocation of 65 businesses affected by the project. It also questioned whether the more user friendly metro line would in

fact provide a lower carbon alternative means of transport, since the freed up road capacity is likely to “simply be taken by traffic that cannot currently fit on the road network.” ADB responded that “HIV/AIDS awareness and preventive guidance” will be included in contracts. It also confirmed that a resettlement plan according to ADB safeguards is in place and that “no delays are expected due to land acquisition”. The ADB acknowledged that it had attempted to analyse the impact of the freed up road capacity, even though “consideration of rebound effects are not required under the CTF guidance”, concluding that any induced traffic was likely to be offset by smoother traffic.

### 2.6.3 Colombia: questions raised over carbon savings<sup>12</sup>

Colombia’s revised investment plan was approved in the May committee meeting. The amendments included an increase of \$1 million for an IBRD urban transport system programme, a decrease of \$200,000 million for IDB, \$10.8 million for the IFC for an energy efficiency programme, and the addition of \$10 million for the IDB renewable energy programme. The total CTF funding remains at \$150 million, but with less than half of the previous estimate of reduction in GHG emissions. Furthermore, amendments to an IDB and IFC sustainable energy finance programme were approved, including modification of scope to go beyond commercial banks and also include other financial intermediaries, such as investment funds. Planned IFC funding of \$4.6 million for investment, and \$50,000 for project implementation and supervision, were cancelled.

In late June, \$200,000 in grants was approved by mail for an IDB project to promote the use of energy efficient technologies among small and medium enterprises, together with \$10,000 in project implementation and supervision services. Moreover, in late July \$40 million was approved for an IDB project on technological transformation for Bogota’s Integrated Public Transport System (SITP). Prior to approval both UK and Germany raised a number of questions, including on the accuracy of the estimated GHG reductions. The UK pointed out that the “carbon savings seems quite high” and contradictory to other related documents. The UK also questioned the cost-effectiveness assessment in several submissions, which led to an agenda item to discuss this topic further at the October meetings. It asked the IDB “to continue to ensure that the development outcomes are delivered, and that they look to improve these where possible, for example by ensuring that the buses support the mobility of women in Bogota, or supporting the most vulnerable people to access markets and jobs.”

Questions were also raised by CSO observer World Resources Institute, including on how the project calculated the estimated emissions directly attributable to CTF financing and how development impact was going to be ensured as many of the expected benefits depended on how the SITP as a whole was going to be implemented. It also raised several other requests, including that “the project should be able to demonstrate to [trust fund committee] members how stakeholder consultations, especially with public transport users, have taken place.” This issue was also raised by Germany, noting that the proposal “does not provide sufficient information on how/whether stakeholder consultations with both bus operators/drivers and users were conducted”. The IDB responded that “carbon savings are presented in the different formats required for the IDB and the CTF”. On user consultations it confirmed that SITP has been presented or the system design shown to a number of groups and that “user opinions have been incorporated in the system design and in key elements”.

### 2.6.4 India: hydropower projects challenged<sup>13</sup>

A project to finance construction of state transmission infrastructure to be used for renewable energy from private sector projects in Rajasthan was approved by mail in July, with \$198 million in loans and \$2 million in grants, together with \$95,000 for ADB project implementation and supervision services. Australia raised concerns about alternative uses for the proposed transmission line: “We would appreciate consideration of what fossil fuel potential exists in the Rajasthan region, and at what scale of investment this could be undesirably incentivised by this transmission infrastructure. Indeed, it would be a perverse outcome if CTF funding was invested in a transmission line that generated greater fossil fuel investment than renewable

energy investment.” ADB responded that “project developers in theory can set up fossil fuel power generation projects” but that a review of Rajasthan’s electricity plan has indicated “low probability for fossil fuel generation capacity addition to significantly increase utilisation of the infrastructure built under the investment programme.”

The World Bank \$100 million development policy loan (DPL) project to promote “green growth” and sustainable development in Himachal Pradesh (HP) (see *CIFs Monitor* [7](#)) was discussed by mail, but approval has been postponed. Germany and France noted that the focus on sustainable development goals could make it difficult to assess the results of the DPL. Furthermore, since the proposal notes the fast pace in hydropower developments in HP in comparison to the rest of the country, “there appears to be little reason to believe that the mere speeding up/modification of (already conducive) permitting and commissioning procedures will trigger any major transformational impact”. In a September response, the Bank conceded that “India’s power generation continues to be coal dominated despite environmental concerns ... any measure that obviates coal based generation and promotes cleaner form of energy is of immense importance”. It argued that “India’s march towards a low carbon economy will never be possible without up scaling hydropower in HP” and that the project will have “catalytic impact since HP does become a role model for other states and has significant hydro potential.”

In a follow up comment in early October the UK wrote “we still have some questions around the implementation potential and how the projects calculate results where renewable energy deployment may not be additional but is instead brought forward by a few years”. It noted conflicting information on carbon savings and that it is “unclear how the private sector leverage has been calculated”. While it supported the local benefit scheme included, it noted that “it would be useful to understand how the developers or authorities will engage with the affected communities to ensure that local groups are educated about the developments, as well as being compensated.” Furthermore: “Have the changes in precipitation and glacial melt water due to climate change mentioned in the proposal been factored into the long term productivity/economics of the proposals? The lifetime of the scheme is so long that the climatic impacts become relevant.” Brazil agreed that “run-of-river hydropower is on a number of cases the best approach, but building dams is also convenient in many cases” and asked for both models to be considered, however, France raised the risk of dams, “as large reservoirs are known to generate GHG emissions.” The IBRD clarified that the DPL will not directly support hydropower, but aims to create “an enabling environment through transformational policy shifts”, and confirmed that most hydropower projects are run of the river.

#### 2.6.5 Ukraine: revised plan approved<sup>14</sup>

Ukraine’s revised investment plan was discussed in the May committee meeting, including the cancellation of the *zero emissions power from gas network project*, with \$100 million funds reallocated to the three other projects in the plan. The committee noted the request for \$350 million in CTF funds to support the plan. Comments on the revisions included a request from Germany to amend the “residual risk” for “sector policies and institutions” from “moderate” to “high”, and add language “on severe administrative and legislative hurdles to wind projects in the Ukraine, that have to be tackled”. The EBRD responded that they agreed with the revision of the risk level, however, they suggested alternative language as they were “not in agreement that the issues are as severe as painted by the German comments”. After amendments, the final revised investment plan was approved in early August.

Furthermore, €19.5 million (\$26.6 million) to the IFC for administration of a private sector programme was approved in late May, together with provisional approval, contingent on the approval of the revised investment plan, of €19 million (\$26 million) in loans and \$200,000 in grants for the IFC and €11.5 million (\$15.7 million) in loans and \$100,000 in grants for the EBRD for advisory services and knowledge management. In addition, \$500,000 for the IFC and \$170,000 for the EBRD were approved for project implementation and supervision services.

### 2.6.6 Indonesia: geothermal project approved<sup>15</sup>

In October, \$149 million was approved for a private sector geothermal energy programme, together with \$750,000 for ADB project implementation and supervision services. The programme will deploy financial products for “multiple private sector geothermal projects ... which face common development and financing barriers”. The US raised concerns that “the geothermal industry in Indonesia has been struggling despite significant theoretical potential, in large part because of a complicated and fragmented institutional framework”. The US also emphasised the importance of ensuring “that institutional problems do not inhibit the gains from potential renewed private sector interest in geothermal.” Germany welcomed the project, but urged the “ADB to strictly implement its environmental safeguards procedures”. Civil society groups have earlier raised concerns about the focus on geothermal energy in Indonesia’s investment plan (see *CIFs Monitor 7*).

### 2.6.7 MENA: allocations modified, energy export still an option<sup>16</sup>

The revised country investment plan for the MENA region was approved at the committee meeting in May. The amendments included a confirmation that Algeria will not request CTF funding. Furthermore, it proposed an increase of Egypt’s allocation from \$95 million to \$123 million, a decrease of Jordan’s allocation from \$112 million to \$50 million, an increase of Morocco’s allocation from \$197 million to \$415 million (including already approved project funding), a decrease of Tunisia’s allocation from \$186 million to \$62 million, and the addition of a technical assistance component of \$10 million. The sub-committee agreed to release the outstanding \$90 million to become available for other CTF projects in the pipeline.

Following the meeting, Germany submitted comments, including a reiteration that they “still aim to develop a joint project in Morocco, exporting electricity from renewable sources to Europe through existing interconnections between Morocco and Spain”, and welcomed “the pragmatic approach of not losing sight of the option to export electricity to Europe, while promoting that in the short term, projects should produce electricity primarily for local markets.” The UK asked for clarification “on whether carbon markets will be used to finance for these projects”.

### 2.6.8 Philippines: small hydropower approved<sup>17</sup>

A \$44 million IBRD project “to help finance renewable energy projects that are less likely to obtain commercial financing – especially in the small hydro sector – while also supporting supply-side energy efficiency in the rural electricity sector” was approved by mail in early August. Prior to the decision the US asked: “How likely is it that the sub-projects will have category A classification [with the highest environmental and social risks] IBRD responded that “at the moment we have no cat ‘A’ projects, and we do not think we will ever have too many that come up, partially because these by their nature will in most cases be more costly, and the project is very focused on financing of least-cost generation projects.” Furthermore, both UK and Germany questioned the calculation of GHG reductions, which according to Germany should be “significantly below” the current estimate. While the IBRD defended the assumptions behind its calculation, it agreed to also include calculations based on different assumptions.

### 2.6.9 Chile: shifts from solar to geothermal<sup>18</sup>

A proposal to reallocate \$33 million from a solar project to a new IDB and IBRD programme on geothermal risk mitigation in Chile’s 2012 investment plan was approved by mail in early October. The revisions were proposed after a new regulation came into force in early 2013, streamlining geothermal project concessions and providing “developers with long-term certainty over development rights to tap into Chile’s geothermal resource potential.” The project aims to “catalyse investments in geothermal energy using risk transfer mechanisms that reduce exploration and development costs and risks, and mobilise private capital to ensure sustainable, long term growth.” While Germany recognised Chile’s “huge but untapped geothermal potential”, it also noted the risks and asked for “an in-depth assessment” of the programme at a later stage.

#### 2.6.10 Egypt: urban transport infrastructure project approved<sup>19</sup>

A \$1 million preparation grant for an urban transport infrastructure project was approved in early August, together with \$50,000 for IBRD implementation and supervision services. Germany asked for further information on several details in the financing plans, while Japan noted overlaps with past projects that should be clarified. The UK also questioned the financial details, and asked that the preparation work should also look at identifying and quantifying emissions savings.

#### 2.6.11 Turkey: energy efficiency project approved<sup>20</sup>

Stage 2 funding (see *CIFs Monitor 7*) for a credit line project for residential energy efficiency was approved in late May, with \$37 million in loans and \$2 million in grants. Furthermore, \$205,000 was approved for EBRD implementation and supervision services. Approval of subsequent tranches of up to \$70 million was delegated to the MDB committee.

#### 2.6.12 Kazakhstan: reallocation among MDBs<sup>21</sup>

A revision to the 2010 investment plan was agreed at the May sub-committee meetings. This included reallocating \$21 million from a renewable energy development programme from the EBRD to the IFC, increasing a municipal energy efficiency and district heating modernisation programme with \$21 million and bringing the ADB on board as an implementing agency. It also meant dropping the \$21 million IFC programme on energy efficiency financing through financial intermediaries. The changes did not have any impact on the overall \$200 million budget.

## 3 Pilot Program for Climate Resilience

### 3.1 Low disbursement of funds

In the May sub-committee meeting, concerns were raised about “the slowdown in submission of projects and programmes for PPCR funding approval and the low disbursement of PPCR funds.” The sub-committee requested “the MDBs and the countries to make concerted efforts to accelerate project development and implementation.” Furthermore, the sub-committee restated that any investment plan that has not received approval for all its projects and programme after 24 months must submit a revision, noting that five pilot countries (Bangladesh, Niger, Tajikistan, Grenada and Samoa) have already reached this stage, and another seven will reach this stage within six months.

An expression of interest to join PPCR from Belize was discussed, and the country was invited to make a presentation on its preparation of an investment plan in the October meeting. In the meeting the sub-committee will also discuss requests received from other countries interested in participating (see page 4), “while noting the importance of not raising expectations among interested countries as to the availability of additional funds and the continued progress on operationalising the Green Climate Fund”. This is a reference to the CIF ‘sunset clause’, requiring CIF to close its operations once a new architecture for climate finance is effective. Furthermore, it emphasised the importance of first and foremost implementing existing projects and programmes.

### 3.2 Funding for civil society engagement in Cambodia<sup>22</sup>

A grant management facility for Cambodian CSOs has been developed by the Cambodian government, with the World Bank, the ADB and Hatfield consultants, based on “feedback and requirements of CSOs”. Key objectives of the funding include to “help communities to coordinate better and better understand their sources of vulnerabilities” and “to capture lessons learned from community-based initiatives”. It is expected that 30-50 grants, ranging from \$30,000 - \$75,000, will be awarded to Cambodian civil society for 12-24 month periods. Grants application guidelines will be developed by the facility.


#### **Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) explained**

The PPCR aspires to demonstrate how climate risk and resilience can be integrated into core development planning and implementation. PPCR funding is disbursed in two phases, to support two types of investment: first, technical assistance to allow developing countries to integrate climate resilience into national and sectoral development plans, resulting in a Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR); and second, funding for the implementation of this programme.

In 2009, nine countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen and Zambia) and two regional groupings (six Caribbean island countries and three Pacific island countries) were invited to participate in the PPCR. All SPCRs have now been endorsed. Papua New Guinea’s SPCR was approved in the November 2012 meeting and Haiti’s in the May 2013 sub-committee meeting.

As of end June, \$1.3 billion has been pledged to the PPCR, out of which \$445 million has been approved comprised of \$300 million in grants and \$145 million in loans.

Graph 3: SCF funding<sup>23</sup>



### 3.3 Private sector projects get green light

Concept notes from Dominica, Haiti, Jamaica, Mozambique, Saint Lucia, Tajikistan and one multi-country proposal for Zambia, Niger and Mozambique were submitted for the new private sector set-aside, to be discussed in the October meeting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*). The majority of proposals target private sector clients through the MDB’s private sector arms. Only one proposal requested grant resources. An independent expert group appointed in August has assessed the proposals and fully recommended two EBRD projects from Tajikistan, one on the energy sector and one on a small business financing facility. Furthermore, an AfDB project on forestry from Mozambique and IDB projects from Jamaica (on urban household water), Saint Lucia (on the agriculture sector) and Haiti (on an agricultural supply chain) were “recommended with conditions”. Two of the remaining proposals (an AfDB regional private sector project and an IBRD project on community adaptation from Dominica) were asked to resubmit after further development, and the remainder, all from Dominica, were not recommended.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, in the May meeting the CIF administrative unit and the MDBs were asked to “prepare further analysis of lessons and good practices to engage the private sector in strengthening climate resilience”, including “an exchange of experiences on this issue among the MDBs, bilateral and other stakeholders”. However, this is not on the agenda of the October meeting.

### 3.4 Programme updates

#### 3.4.1 Bangladesh: coastal embankment and private sector projects approved<sup>25</sup>

In late April, the sub-committee approved by mail \$25 million in grants for a coastal embankment improvement project, with \$272,000 for IBRD implementation and supervision services. Prior to approval Australia welcomed the project but requested that “the resettlement action plan ... effectively implements environmental and social safeguard procedures”. This was supported by the UK, Spain and Germany who also commented that “it needs to be ensured that the population in the project area has a key role in the design and implementation of specific activities in their communities”, and that gender aspects should be reflected “more strongly” in the results framework, which the IBRD agreed with and amended accordingly.

A \$3.4 million IFC project to provide technical assistance for a project on climate-resilient agriculture and food security and a project on climate-resilient housing was approved by mail in July. The UK welcomed the agriculture project, as “bringing a much needed private sector focus on the agriculture sector”, but also



raised issues, such as clarity on “what the business model for private sector engagement really is and how the private sector will make its profit margins”. Germany and Spain suggested further improvements, such as applying a “gender-sensitive approach also to the impact level, so as to track effectively how women and men benefit from the project activities.” The US raised concerns, including a call for focussing on non-rice cereals due to an already existing multi-partner project on rice. In response to the concerns the IFC clarified that they will look for synergies with other project, and that the project preparation included “extensive stakeholder consultations and focus group discussions with farmers, private and public sector”. Moreover: “Business opportunities for private sector agribusiness companies ... were also taken into consideration”.

#### 3.4.2 Cambodia: land and resettlement concerns in agriculture project<sup>26</sup>

In March, the sub-committee approved by mail \$4.5 million in grants and \$5 million in loans for a business-focussed agriculture adaptation project, with \$232,500 for ADB implementation and supervision services. Prior to approval, Germany and Spain cautioned that “substantial concerns remain, particularly related to issues of land policy and land management, to the project’s expected impact on poorer families, and to the use of PPCR funds”. They stated they “see a certain risk for these funds to be used to merely finance an expansion of on-going, rather conventional investment activities.” They further noted, “In view of the fact that the target beneficiaries are rice-producers capable of producing marketable rice surplus, the impacts on poorer families and poverty reduction ... seem to be inflated, because poorer families generally have smaller land resources and irrigated areas”. The UK advocated for transparency around land management and expressed “particular concerns ... about the references to resettlement and the lack of clear measures to address the associated risks” and called for an assessment of the likelihood of involuntary resettlement. The ADB agreed that the resettlements concerns “are valid” and have been addressed under ADB safeguards.

#### 3.4.3 Nepal: grant for watershed project<sup>27</sup>

In early August, the sub-committee approved \$23.5 million in grants for a watersheds project, with \$488,000 for ADB implementation and supervision services. Prior to approval, the UK noted that the document did not make any reference to either Nepal’s National Adaptation Programme of Action or Local Adaptation Plan of Action. It also expressed surprise that there were no outcomes or indicators related to food security, despite that “food security is a huge problem in the proposed project districts”. The UK also advised that the project should include conflict resolution approaches, given that access to water can be a source of conflict. Germany also asked for clarifications, including how the “new” watershed planning approach sets apart from conventional watershed management planning. No response from the ADB was publically available at the time of writing.

#### 3.4.4 Zambia: river basin project numbers scrutinised<sup>28</sup>

A project to strengthen climate resilience in a river basin was approved by mail in September, with \$20.5 million in grants and \$17.5 million in loans in additional PPCR resources, together with approval of a final tranche of \$390,000 for AfDB project implementation and supervision services. On co-financing the UK noted that it “includes other Zambia SPCR projects, and while it is good that these projects are well coordinated it is perhaps misleading to list these as co-finance”. It also asked for clarification of discrepancies on numbers, since the document referred to 800,000 communities supported in one place and 800,000 people in another place. The US questions included clarification on “the need for \$410,000 to purchase 4WD vehicles, \$140,000 for motorcycles and \$760,000 for vehicle [operations & maintenance].” Spain and Germany raised particular concerns regarding “the lack of sufficient involvement” of relevant ministries. No response from the AfDB was publically available at the time of writing.

#### 3.4.5 Samoa: coastal communities resettlement questions<sup>29</sup>

In early October, \$14.6 million in grants, as well as an additional allocation of \$5 million agreed in the November 2012 meeting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*), was approved by mail for a project “to support coastal communities to become more resilient to climate variability and change.” Furthermore, a final tranche of

\$400,000 was approved for IBRD project implementation and supervision services. Prior to approval the UK raised concerns “about the references in the project to involuntary resettlement”, and asked for further details including “a thorough assessment of what the risks and social and political implications are”, which was seconded by Australia. Germany and Spain put forward a number of recommendations, including that the 30 per cent target of female beneficiaries should be raised, since “women make up around 50 per cent of the population”.

#### 3.4.6 Bolivia: river basins project approved after delay<sup>30</sup>

After a long delay an integrated river basin management project with \$9.5 million in grants and \$36 million in loans was approved in early October, together with a final tranche of \$475,000 to the IBRD for project implementation and supervision services. The delay was partly caused by the UK having several conversations with the IBRD reiterating concerns, including that the unit set up to manage the project “may not have the mandate to ensure an impact on planning at the national level”, which they considered of particular importance since the size of the project “is particularly large by PPCR standards”. Australia strongly supported “the proposed participation by the poor, indigenous groups and women” and asked for more information and articulation on how they would be involved in the consultation process in this project. It also noted concerns about institutional capacity. Germany raised concerns about the “moderate to low level of ambition” of the project indicators reflecting the PPCR core indicators, to which the IBRD responded that they will try to reformulate some of the indicators.

#### 3.4.7 Yemen: climate information systems grant approval<sup>31</sup>

In March, \$19 million in grants were approved by mail for a project on climate information systems and PPCR programme coordination, including \$486,500 for IBRD implementation and supervision services. Germany raised concerns regarding the long-term viability of the project, and called for indicators to be strengthened, including the gender indicators, which was taken onboard. The UK asked for political and security risks to be addressed. It also questioned the high proportion of costs on supervision services, consultancy and training, and asked for further breakdown. The IBRD and Yemen responded in late April referring to “the great need to improve capacity of all stakeholders”, as well as the need for “highly specialised consultancy services” to develop the technical design.

#### 3.4.8 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: airport development questioned<sup>32</sup>

In early October, an additional allocation of \$5 million, as agreed in the November 2012 meeting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*), was approved for a regional disaster vulnerability programme, with an additional tranche of \$100,000 for project implementation and supervision services for the IBRD. Spain and Germany noted that the proposal included “additional resources to be dedicated to support the ‘development of the new airport, which will support long-term resiliency and economic growth’... While we acknowledge the importance of an international airport ... it will be essential to demonstrate how the PPCR support differs from a conventional infrastructure project. To this end, we recommend clarifying in the project proposal what kind of adaptation activities this support comprises, and most importantly, how the development of the airport will further advance the objectives of the SPCR.” No response was publically available at the time of writing.

#### 3.4.9 Tonga: infrastructure resilience projects approved<sup>33</sup>

As agreed in the November 2012 meeting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*), an additional \$5 million was granted to Tonga in late August, for evacuation and post disaster roads and coastal protection. Furthermore, \$19.25 million was approved in early October for a project to strengthen capacity “of government and communities to finance, develop, implement and monitor investments to improve ecosystem resilience and climate proof critical infrastructure”, together with \$199,400 in a final tranche to the ADB for project implementation and supervision services. The UK welcomed the proposal, but asked for more clarification on the potential consequences of the involuntary resettlement safeguard being triggered. Germany raised “some concerns regarding the project’s expected outcome and impact” and that “gender issues should

feature more prominently in the project's hierarchy of objectives and at the higher levels of its design and monitoring framework."

#### **3.4.10 Haiti: SPCR approved<sup>34</sup>**

Haiti's SPCR was approved in the May sub-committee meeting, noting \$25 million in requested grant funding. It also approved a first tranche of funding for MDB preparation and supervision services, with \$240,000 for an IBRD project on infrastructure, \$250,000 for an IBRD project on coastal cities, \$470,000 for an IBRD project on water resources, and \$250,000 for an IDB project on agriculture.

#### **3.4.11 Tajikistan: energy sector project approved<sup>35</sup>**

An \$11 million energy sector resilience project was approved in August, together with \$175,000 to EBRD for project implementation and supervision services. Germany and Spain recommended "arrangements to ensure that the enhanced production of electric energy translates into increased availability to local users instead of increased export rates." They also called for gender aspects to be reflected in the results framework.

## 4 Forest Investment Program

### 4.1 Private sector proposals recommended

Decisions are due to be made on funding for proposals under the FIP private sector set-asides<sup>36</sup> at the sub-committee meeting in October. This follows discussions earlier this year on the procedures for how the \$56 million fund to engage the private sector on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and sustainable forest management will work (see *CIFs Monitor 7*). The proposals will be assessed on their coherence with country investment plans, level of innovation and feasibility.

A total of 11 proposals were received from Brazil, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana and Mexico and one region (Africa), which have been assessed by an August appointed independent expert group.<sup>37</sup> The group has recommended four proposals from Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mexico, totalling \$20.3 million in loans, to be discussed further in the October meeting. Furthermore, proposals from Burkina Faso, Brazil and two from DRC, totalling \$31 million in loans, were also recommended, subject to further information.<sup>38</sup>

A March CIF report *Incentivising the involvement of the private sector in REDD+* identified key lessons learnt to date including that: the FIP's added value is to focus on advisory services; the private sector is a key source of REDD+ finance and private sector engagement is dependent on demonstrated profitability of sustainable forest management.

### 4.2 Results monitoring and reporting framework

At the November 2012 FIP sub-committee meeting there was disagreement on a 'simplified' results framework with a decision taken to include a broader set of indicators (see *CIF Monitor 7*). At the May meeting<sup>39</sup> it was decided to request the CIF administrative unit to hold a session at the October 2013 FIP pilot countries meeting for further discussion and recommendation on the proposed core indicators. A final version of the core indicators will be presented for approval at the FIP October sub-committee meeting. In addition, the October FIP sub-committee meeting will discuss the reporting proposal which sets out the areas to be reported on biannually by FIP pilot countries including: common themes (GHG emissions reductions/ enhancement of carbon stocks, and livelihoods co-benefits); other relevant co-benefit themes (biodiversity and other environmental services; governance; tenure, rights and access; capacity development); and a narrative report on common topics to be agreed.

#### Forest Investment Program (FIP) explained

The FIP is a financing instrument aimed at assisting countries to reach their goals under reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+). It aspires to provide scaled up financing to developing countries to initiate reforms identified in national REDD+ strategies, which detail the policies, activities and other strategic options for achieving REDD+ objectives. It anticipates additional benefits in areas such as biodiversity conservation and protection of the rights of indigenous people.

The FIP covers eight pilot countries, out of which seven investment plans have been endorsed (Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Laos, Mexico, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Indonesia). Peru is expected to finalise its plan by end of 2013.

As of end June, \$639 million had been pledged to FIP, and funding for three projects for a total of \$73 million (\$45 million in grants and \$28 million in concessional loans) had been approved. Cumulative funding decisions by the FIP sub-committee total \$89 million.

### 4.3 Dedicated grant mechanism for indigenous peoples

The aim of the dedicated grant mechanism for indigenous peoples and local communities (DGM) is to “provide grants to indigenous peoples and local communities in country or regional pilots to support their participation in the development of the FIP investment strategies, programmes and projects” (see *CIFs Monitor 7*, 6, 5).<sup>40</sup> According to the annotated provisional agenda for the October FIP sub-committee meeting the DGM has now “moved into the preparation stage for the projects implementing the mechanism at the country level.” The October FIP semi-annual operational report states that “seven of the eight FIP pilot countries have requested the World Bank to implement the DGM in their countries”.<sup>41</sup> The final framework operation guidelines were endorsed and published in mid-September. They set out how the DGM will be implemented and provide information on: governance, review, safeguards, grievance and complaints procedure. At the May meeting the sub-committee approved funding for IBRD preparation and supervision services to Brazil (first tranche of \$300,000, total budget \$700,000) and Ghana (first tranche of \$155,000, total budget \$500,000).

A total of \$6.5 million has been requested to establish the DGM in Brazil. This funding is proposed to cover several components under consideration including increasing indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ capacity for investment preparedness in relation to forest investments, payment for environmental services and carbon payments; funds for indigenous peoples to manage “small-scale activities for sustainable development and natural resources”; and communication, monitoring and evaluation and reporting.

Project funds requested for Ghana total \$5.5 million to cover community capacity building; small grants “to support the implementation of community level activities related to economic activities and rural livelihood practices that enhance climate change mitigation and adaptation, investments in sustainable management of forest landscapes, development of alternative and sustainable livelihoods”; and communication and coordination.

**Table 1: DGM country programme indicative allocation**<sup>42</sup>

Country	MDB responsible	Indicative allocation of DGM resources (mill.US \$)
Brazil	IBRD	6.5
Burkina Faso	IBRD	4.5
DRC	IBRD	6.0
Ghana	IBRD	5.5
Indonesia	IBRD	6.5
Lao PDR	IBRD	4.5
Mexico	TBD*	6.0
Peru	TBD*	5.5
Global	IBRD	5.0
Total		50.0

### 4.4 Programme updates

#### 4.4.1 Lao PDR: rehabilitation project approved<sup>43</sup>

In June the sub-committee approved \$3 million in grant funding for advisory services provided by the IFC for a smallholder forestry programme. The aim of the programme is to “rehabilitate degraded forests and grasslands”, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and improve rural community livelihoods (including training 15,000 farmers in farming and business practices).

Prior to approval the US and the UK raised a number of issues, including that there was no clear theory of change or sufficient information on how funds would be spent. Both countries also asked if the programme could lead to perverse incentives to clear additional land. The IFC responded that the “programme will be implemented on lands that have already been deforested and settled, and are unlikely to be reforested by natural means. Additionally, the programme aims to prevent further conversion of forests to agriculture.” The UK also asked “why the company that is likely to be the client in this project cannot be named?” The IFC responded that it was engaging with “one of the largest international forestry companies by sales” but could not reveal a name for confidentiality reasons. Furthermore, the UK asked if the planned plantations are “going to result in extensive areas of monoculture? What are the implications for biodiversity and for livelihoods reliant on other forest products that are currently available from ‘degraded areas’?” The IFC replied: “The plantation compartments of mainly acacia and eucalyptus trees are being established in a mosaic of planted and natural vegetation.”

#### 4.4.2 Peru: plan strongly contested by indigenous groups<sup>44</sup>

At the May FIP sub-committee meeting the co-chairs invited Peru to submit by mail its draft investment plan, which could be for up to \$50 million<sup>45</sup>. The plan will be presented for endorsement at the October FIP sub-committee meeting.

Earlier in February the Peruvian Indigenous Peoples Association AIDSESEP (Inter-Ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon) wrote to the FIP sub-committee and the Peruvian government to ask that approval of the investment plan be delayed until agreements made with FIP consultants were included (see *CIF Monitor 7*). AIDSESEP says the indigenous groups it represents own 13 million hectares of Amazonian land. The IDB responded in an April letter saying the investment plan was still in draft form and would be made publicly available for consultation with stakeholders including AIDSESEP and indigenous peoples organisation Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP).<sup>46</sup> AIDSESEP wrote to the IDB again in July to express its strong disagreement with the draft investment plan because there has not been sufficient consultation and it did not comply with indigenous rights, territories and safeguards. Furthermore, the letter strongly criticised the investment plan’s bias in favour of private sector interests such as logging, plantations and palm oil. They also raised concern that priority was being given to “offsets” instead of the Amazonian indigenous REDD+ proposal.<sup>47</sup>

A fourth joint mission by the IDB, World Bank and IFC visited Peru in September to meet stakeholders and prepare the investment plan. However, following the joint mission AIDSESEP and CONAP sent a letter to the FIP sub-committee, Peruvian government, IDB and World Bank criticising the final version of the investment plan for including new text they had not seen and also failing to include certain prior agreements. As a result AIDSESEP and CONAP said they should be allowed to attend the October sub-committee meeting as observers. They expressed particular concern that the new investment plan text referred to indigenous peoples as a cause of deforestation and that it did not include their proposal for public funding for REDD+ and not only “private markets for environmental services”. AIDSESEP did acknowledge some of its key demands had been included such as \$14.5 million for land titling, safeguards, community forestry management and the Amazonian indigenous REDD+ proposal.<sup>48</sup>

#### 4.4.3 Burkina Faso: approval delay after queries on forest roads and alternative livelihoods<sup>49</sup>

Two projects are currently under consideration in Burkina Faso. In August \$11.5 million was requested for the participatory forest management project for REDD+ with support from the AfDB. The objective of the project is to contribute to improving the carbon sequestration capacity of “gazetted forests” and reducing poverty in rural areas. It will cover 284,000 hectares in 12 forest reserves in four regions of the country. It is projected to capture 4.7 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>. The project approval has currently been postponed.

The US and the UK both asked how building 2,487 kilometres of forest roads “will lead to reduced deforestation and forest degradation?” The AfDB responded that the “roads are rather forest (paths) roads built to facilitate the management, maintenance and protection of forest. These forest roads will be maintained by the communities”. The UK also asked “to what extent are households in the project areas

dependent upon the gazetted forests (unregulated activity) for their livelihoods? In the event of a reduction in these activities in the gazetted forests, to what degree will households lose?" They also asked for clarity on what would happen to communities living in the gazetted areas saying "we assume that they are NOT to be removed from these areas" and requested additional analysis on the potential winners and losers under the project. The US asked for clarification on the nature of "compensation to those who will no longer have access to forests after the project is implemented" and whether there is "any resettlement activity planned in this project?" The AfDB replied: "there is no displacement in any forest of the project."

Furthermore, the US asked "what particular activities do you expect the PES [Payment for Environmental Services] will be required in order to incentivise, and to what extent is the rationale for the PES system to compensate for reduced incomes caused by the adoption of alternative livelihoods?" The AfDB responded that the objective of the forest co-management section of the project was "to make the communities responsible for forest and infrastructures including forest roads maintenance in return for payments for environmental services". Moreover "in the longer term, this PES will rely on resources derived from the sale of carbon after the operationalisation of REDD+ in Burkina Faso. The project is expected to contribute to establishing the REDD+ strategy in Burkina Faso. It will therefore be used to prepare the country for future environmental service payments based on duly measured GHG reduction efforts."

Following further correspondence with AfDB in September the US and the UK requested more information about project implementation before it goes ahead. They particularly asked for clarification on how feasible alternative livelihood strategies are in practice and more analysis on the impact of reduced access to fuel wood: "we are still not convinced that the fuel wood issue has been adequately addressed."

A decentralised forest and woodland management project with a budget of \$16.5 million, as well as \$325,000 for AfDB project preparation and supervision services (second tranche of \$650,000 total) was due to be approved in mid-September but has been delayed by donor queries. The US and the UK queried what consultations had already been carried out with communities with the US stating "communities must be involved in decisions on alternative livelihoods". The UK requested more details on how the project would protect biodiversity and ecosystem services that are under threat because "there are no details provided on activities to do this, and no indicators in the logframe." Furthermore, in reference to both project proposals the UK said "it is evident that they rely one upon the other to meet their objectives" and for this reason requested "a reworking of both proposals" to show how the projects would fit together and to address questions previously raised on livelihoods, PES, biodiversity and project calculations.

#### 4.4.4 DRC: project approved despite questions on capacity and poverty targeting<sup>50</sup>

In August the sub-committee approved \$21.5 million in grant funding for an integrated REDD+ project in the Mbuji-Mayi/Kananga and Kisangani basins with support and supervision services of the AfDB (for which it will receive a final tranche of \$300,000, total budget of \$900,000). The project's "goal is to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and forest degradation while helping to reduce poverty among the populations" in three regions. Specifically, the project aims to: (i) decrease the rate of deforestation and forest degradation; (ii) promote the sustainable development of the wood energy sector; (iii) promote land security and the promotion of alternatives to the slash-and-burn agricultural practices. The main beneficiaries are claimed to be local communities, indigenous peoples and the local private sector.

Prior to approval several donors asked for clarification on the project design. The UK, US, Australia and Japan all queried whether there was sufficient government capacity to implement the project. The UK asked for more detail on how the PES schemes would work. The AfDB replied that payments to communities would be dependent on "compliance with the land use plans" including investment and "compliance with the zoning (which means compensation for maintaining carbon stocks)". Several donors also wanted clarity on whether the project would be financed by voluntary carbon markets and how this would affect calculations for emissions savings. The AfDB responded that "the project is not designed for seeking immediate carbon payments" but later added the aim was for PES funding to come from carbon revenues "generated at the national level through the sales of REDD+ carbon credit".

The UK asked: “Will there be any groups (especially the poorest) that currently rely on degraded areas targeted for reforestation that might ‘lose’ in terms of access once these areas are designated for tree planting?” The AfDB replied “plantations should respect the land use plans, which in turn integrate the needs of the poorest as well as the designated areas to fulfil such needs. Furthermore, appropriate mitigation measures recommended by the environmental and social safeguards will be applied where plantations would actually create restrictions of access for the poor.” The US asked: “will the project support industrial scale logging in primary tropical forests?” The AfDB replied, “The project will not support any industrial logging activity and ... FIP interventions are outside the forest concession areas”.

#### 4.4.5 Ghana: REDD+ project approved<sup>51</sup>

In September the FIP sub-committee approved \$9.75 million for a project to engage local communities in REDD+ and enhancement of carbon stocks. The AfDB will receive \$200,000 for project implementation and supervisory services (total cost \$400,000). With a total cost of \$15.8 million, the project will be implemented over five years. The project will cover two regions with an objective to “contribute to the increase of carbon stocks and poverty reduction in the off-reserve areas of the high forest zones by engaging communities in land management approaches that generate direct financial and environmental benefits.” The project forms part of a coordinated investment plan to be co-financed through basket funding with the World Bank and the IFC. This will lead to emission reductions and the protection of carbon reservoirs as part of the REDD+ agenda. The Bank-financed portion of the investment plan supports (i) restoration of degraded agricultural landscapes, (ii) climate-smart agriculture, (iii) livelihoods improvement and (iv) capacity building.

The UK agreed to the project but asked for clarification on compensation to cocoa farmers to reduce deforestation and sources of income for communities working on tree plantations. The US also accepted the project but asked for more information on the selection of plantation locations and how credit would be accessed.

#### 4.4.6 Indonesia: civil society protests of FIP

Although controversial, the \$70 million investment plan was endorsed at the November 2012 FIP sub-committee meeting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*, 6, 5). In late September, the Alliance of Yogyakarta Civil Society Against the Forest Investment Plan criticised the FIP in Indonesia “due to non-transparent information and non-inclusive to peoples’ participation, furthermore, due to its direction that strengthens tenure conflicts, violence, corruption and gender injustices”. In a letter addressed to the FIP sub-committee, World Bank, ADB and IFC, the Alliance wrote “FIP Indonesia will bring benefits to private businesses in forestry sector only. For example, FIP Indonesia includes 750,000 hectares, majority-owned by the forest concession holders, wood plantations and also oil-palm plantations. Hence FIP Indonesia will strengthen expropriation and marginalisation of rights of indigenous and local communities and women in the governance of forest resources.”<sup>52</sup> The Alliance requested to attend the FIP pilot country meeting held in Indonesia in late September as observers. The meeting covered the FIP reporting framework, Indonesia’s experience of FIP and the role of the private sector. As the Alliance received no response they held a protest outside meeting.

#### 4.4.7 Brazil: forest information project approved despite complaints on due diligence<sup>53</sup>

In mid-October \$16.45 million was approved by mail for the project *Forest information to support public and private sectors in managing initiatives*. An additional \$250,000 was approved for IDB supervisory services (the final tranche of a total of \$500,000). The project aims to “contribute to the promotion of sustainable programmes aimed at mitigating GHG emissions in the Cerrado biome”. The UK said it was finding it difficult to access “social, environmental appraisals, theory of change, operational manuals and additional annexes” without which “it is difficult for us to fully assess this project”. Neither the CIF administrative unit nor the IDB had replied at the time of writing.



## 5 Scaling up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries

### 5.1 Progress on new investment plans

Tanzania's investment plan was endorsed by mail in July. It joined the other six SREP countries Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, the Maldives, Mali and Nepal. Liberia is expected to submit its plan to the October sub-committee meeting for endorsement. According to the August CIFs FY14 business plan and budget, 18 proposals for project funding would be put forward for approval in FY13, but noted "this target clearly proved too ambitious, and was adjusted downward (to four projects)" in March.<sup>54</sup> The May sub-committee meeting also raised that "a significant number of projects" due to be approved during FY13 were not submitted and urged the MDBs to speed up this process in FY14. Looking ahead to FY14, MDB support for programming activities will target the preparation and submission of the investment plans for Armenia, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Yemen. The remaining plan on Mongolia is expected to be delivered in FY15.

### 5.2 Private sector funding approved

Decisions are due to be made on funding for proposals under the SREP private sector set-asides at the October sub-committee meeting.<sup>55</sup> The procedures for how the private sector should be funded were presented in April, including how to assess coherence with country investment plans, level of innovation, feasibility and demonstration of private sector support. A July-appointed expert panel has ranked the 12 proposals received and proposed a priority list of six concepts (from Maldives, Mali, Kenya, Nepal and two from Honduras) for a total of \$84.6 million to be allocated from the \$90 million available. In addition, the panel has listed three concepts requiring further work, should further funding become available. Eleven of the proposals requested concessional loans, with three of them also requesting additional grant funding. Only one requested grant funding.<sup>56</sup>

#### Scaling up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP) explained

SREP was launched in 2009. It aims to catalyse scaled up investment in renewable energy markets in low-income countries by enabling government support for market creation and private sector implementation.

Six countries were selected for SREP pilot programmes in 2010: Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, the Maldives, Mali and Nepal. A seventh country, Tanzania, was approved in March 2012 and an eighth country, Liberia, in January 2013. All the investment plans of the original pilot countries have been approved. Tanzania's investment plan was endorsed in July and Liberia is expected to submit its plan to the October sub-committee for endorsement. Three countries and one region remain on the reserve list: Armenia, Mongolia, Yemen and the Pacific Region.

As of end June, \$524 million had been pledged to SREP and four projects had been approved for a total of \$46 million (\$19 million in grants and \$27 million in concessional loans). Cumulative funding decisions by the SREP sub-committee total \$62 million.

### 5.3 Results framework: business environment for energy report agreed

Following on from previous discussions on the frequency and extent of reporting (see *CIFs Monitor 7*) the SREP sub-committee meeting in October is expected to review progress of assessments being undertaken in SREP countries. In June the CIF administrative unit requested approval of the concept note for a proposal for reporting on enabling environments for promoting energy investments, together with \$530,000 funds to proceed (SREP to provide \$340,000, the World Bank \$115,000 and USAID a further \$75,000). This work is based on an April proposal from the CIF administrative unit for an annual or biennial global index report on the business environment for energy to “track policy indicators related to improving the business environment for investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy access in each SREP country”. The framework “will also allow for the comparison and benchmarking of enabling environment conditions among countries as well as tracking progress over time.”

Comments from countries, including the US, Sweden, and Spain, focussed on the perceived high implementation costs, whether the reporting would focus only on SREP countries, how work on indicators would be integrated with other initiatives such as Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) and whether ‘negative indicators’ (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies) would be included. The World Bank responded to the sub-committee in July justifying the projected budget and said it would aim to reduce costs where possible upon which the proposal was approved.

### 5.4 Programme updates

#### 5.4.1 Tanzania: focus on geothermal and rural electrification<sup>57</sup>

Tanzania’s investment plan was endorsed in principle at the inter-sessional meeting of the SREP sub-committee in July. The aims of the investment plan are to facilitate an enabling environment for public and private policies, increase investment in renewable energy and to increase energy access with positive social benefits. The plan requested an indicative allocation of \$50 million and centred on two key projects. The sub-committee approved a preparation grant of \$700,000 for a geothermal project allocated to the AfDB, which will receive another \$250,000 as the first tranche of funding for project implementation services (total \$450,000). A preparation grant of \$800,000 for a rural electrification project was allocated to the World Bank and another \$200,000 to the IFC. The World Bank will also receive another \$214,000 as the first tranche of funding for project implementation services (total \$428,000).

Prior to approval several countries queried if expectations of significant private sector funding were realistic. The US and Australia said: “like others, we notice that there is a significant expectation of private co-financing in the program. Essentially, you are relying on public finance for development and hope to attract private infrastructure finance later.” The Tanzanian government replied there was already private sector interest and it was confident the required investments would happen if promises of adequate returns could be made. It added, “the government has instituted a range of energy sector reforms which have attracted private sector investment to boost electricity supply”.

Before final approval in September, Switzerland confirmed it would endorse the investment plan but said it was “still not satisfied with the answers regarding the very high leverage factor for private sector investments (including commercial bank loans) to be mobilised for the geothermal component. The mere mentioning of this funding in a financing table of the investment plan is not enough”. In a final response, the government of Tanzania said it acknowledged the “recommendations provided by Switzerland and will definitely be taken on board during the project preparations”. The UK stated, “Given the importance of community consent, involvement and awareness to off-grid market expansion, the programme design should set out a stronger approach to facilitating community and CSO engagement”. The Tanzanian government replied that the IFC had the necessary experience and knowledge to carry out community engagement.

In a letter to the SREP sub-committee the civil society observer Transparency International, on behalf of civil society organisations in Africa:

- Requested clarification on private sector interest in investing in the geothermal energy project. “This is principally to avert the risk and financial burden that this may pose to the people of Tanzania”;
- Recommended that the Tanzanian government and MDBs focus efforts on obtaining consent from communities, because the country “has not had a geothermal project before, communities have not been involved in such projects”;
- Asked for an independent body to carry out an anti-corruption assessment;
- Supported open access to data for transparency including further details on public disclosure of projects; and
- Requested clarification on the amount of funding as loans for the investment plan.

**Table 2: Projected financing for Tanzania’s SREP investment plan<sup>58</sup>**

Funding source	Geothermal Power Development (millions)	Renewable Energy for Rural Electrification (millions)
SREP	\$25	\$25
Government of Tanzania	\$1.5	\$2.4
African Development Bank	\$45	-
World Bank	-	\$50
Private sector	\$142.5	\$30.4
Commercial banks	\$317.5	\$28
Other development partners	\$5.3	\$46.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$536.8</b>	<b>\$182.4</b>

#### 5.4.2 Liberia: plan faces participation challenge<sup>59</sup>

Liberia is expected to submit its plan to the sub-committee for endorsement at the October sub-committee meeting. An August joint mission with representatives from the World Bank, the IFC and the AfDB visited Liberia to meet the government, private sector and civil society and “support the government in designing” the plan which could receive funding of up to \$50 million. A May progress update on Liberia’s preparations for SREP funding noted that “although the stakeholders have been responsive by participating in the consultation activities, it has been quite a challenge in reaching all stakeholders across the country”. It identified that it will be important to “make capacity building a key component of the investment plan given the low capacity on the ground”.

#### 5.4.3 Honduras: clean cookstoves approved<sup>60</sup>

In mid-October, \$2.9 million was approved for a sustainable rural energisation project that will focus on “building enabling market conditions and strengthening a network of rural enterprises to promote, build, distribute, maintain and supervise the installation and proper use of clean cookstoves.” Switzerland asked for more detailed budget information including amounts to be distributed via the “three proposed financing modalities that are to be promoted (i.e. (a) cost-share incentives; (b) carbon credits/payments for environmental services; (c) loan products for the clean cookstoves sector).” Spain approved the project but asked for transparency over beneficiary selection to receive finance subsidies and microcredits to acquire cookstoves. The UK approved the project but asked in future for approvals to include all project components.

## ANNEX

## CIF CSO and indigenous peoples observers

	<b>Africa</b>	<b>Asia/Pacific</b>	<b>Latin America</b>	<b>Developed countries</b>	<b>Indigenous peoples</b>
<b>CTF</b>	Joseph Adelegan, Global Network for Environment and Economic Development Research, Nigeria	Elpidio Peria, Biodiversity, Innovation, and Trade Society Policy Centre, Philippines	Sergio Sanchez, Clean Air Institute, Mexico	Clifford Polycarp, World Resources Institute, USA	
<b>SCF</b>	Judy Ndichu, Transparency International, Kenya	Archana Godbole, Applied Environmental Research Foundation, India	Fernanda Gebara, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil	Adrian Rimmer, The Gold Standard Foundation, Switzerland	Grace Balawag, TEBTEBBA Foundation, Philippines  Legborsi Saro Pyagbara, The movement for the survival of the Ogoni People, Nigeria
<b>SREP</b>	Judy Ndichu, Transparency International, Kenya	Padam Hamal, Neighbour Organisation, Nepal	Juan Diego Osorio de Armero, Asociación Hondureña de Pequeños Productores de Energía Renovable, Honduras <sup>1</sup>	Adrian Rimmer, The Gold Standard Foundation, Switzerland	Legborsi Saro Pyagbara, The movement for the survival of the Ogoni People, Nigeria  Hortencia Hidalgo, Network of Indigenous Women on Biodiversity of Latin America, Chile

<sup>1</sup> Replacing Bessy Bendana, Asociación Hondureña de Pequeños Productores de Energía Renovable, Honduras

<p><b>FIP</b></p>	<p>Gertrude Kenyangi, Support for Women in Agriculture and Environment, Uganda</p>	<p>Archana Godbole, Applied Environmental Research Foundation, India</p>	<p>Fernanda Gebara, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil</p>	<p>Rick Jacobsen, Global Witness, UK</p>	<p>Juan Carlos Jintiach, COICA, Ecuador</p> <p>Khamla Soubandith, CKSA, Laos</p> <p><i>Alternates:</i> Saoudata Aboubacrine, Tinhinane, Burkina Faso</p> <p>Marcial Arias, CICA, Panama</p>
<p><b>PPCR</b></p>	<p>Camilo Nhancale, Kuwuka JDA, Mozambique</p> <p>Ayouba Abdou Sani, Jeunes Volontaires Pour L'Environmen, Niger</p>	<p>Marion Verles, Nexus, Cambodia</p>	<p>David Luther, Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral, Dominican Republic</p>	<p>Nathalie Eddy, Global Gender and Climate Alliance, USA</p>	<p>Mrinal Kanti Tripura, Maleya Foundation, Bangladesh</p> <p>Fiu Mataese Elisara, OLSSI, Samoa</p>

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<sup>53</sup> <http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifnet/?q=country/brazil>

<sup>54</sup> CIFs FY14 Business plan and budget

[https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/FY14\\_business\\_plan\\_and\\_budget.pdf](https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/FY14_business_plan_and_budget.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> SREP private sector set-asides <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/set-aside/srep>

<sup>56</sup>

[https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/SREP\\_SC.10\\_7\\_Review\\_and\\_selection\\_of\\_concepts\\_to\\_be\\_financed\\_from\\_the\\_private\\_sector\\_set\\_aside\\_0.pdf](https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/SREP_SC.10_7_Review_and_selection_of_concepts_to_be_financed_from_the_private_sector_set_aside_0.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifnet/country/tanzania>

<sup>58</sup> Final version of Tanzania SREP investment plan

[https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/SREP\\_Tanzania\\_Investment\\_Plan\\_Design.pdf](https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/SREP_Tanzania_Investment_Plan_Design.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifnet/country/liberia>

<sup>60</sup> <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifnet/?q=country/honduras>